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IIJTRODUCT ION
As a result of the increased effects of the present defense
program, which either directly or indirectly affects every individual,
industrial decentralization is rapidly assuming greater importance as
a fixed policy for the United States, Increased developments in mili-
tary aviation, coupled with recent developments in the present world
crisis, have brought the proble.m of industrial production for military
defense into the foreground as an established part of our rearmeunent
program.
This new phase of industrial development has received com-
paratively little attention in the past century, and though numerous
proponents of decentralization have advocated its development on
economic and social grounds, their theories have been dwarfed by the
importantance of national defense.
Comparatively little research has been done on the subject
of decentralization, particularly as it applies to defense, because
it is a new and potential problem which threatens to overshadow all
argiments previously expounded in its favor.
In this treatise of the subject an attempt has been made
to briefly reviev; the causes of centralized industry and recent fac-
tors which have tended to encourage and retard decentralization. An
analysis of present industrial location discloses the degree of con-
centration within the various geographical areas of the nation, and the
military difficulties vrtiich are experienced in the defense of these
vital areas have been enumerated.
An investigation into the extent of decentralization v;-ithin
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the covmtry and a detailed review of present government plans and
policies endeavor to shovf the extent and importance which decentra-
lization can be expected to assume and how it may tend to affect
the social and economic trends within the country.
This manuscript does not exhaust the subject of decentra-
lization but merely serves as the starting point in v/hat could
easily be an extensive study covering a more detailed analysis of
every subject mentioned.
If this brief survey serves to avfaken in the reader the
recognition and importance of this subject and the tremendous effects
which it may have on our country and our way of life, it may be said
to have accomplished its purpose as a small contribution to the social,
economic, and industrial problems of national defense.
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The Increased Importance of Industry in Defense
The realization by the American people that our national
security is in danger and that the grim tragedy of war may soon be a
reality makes us face the necessity of rearmament on a vast undreamed-
of scale. We find that our industrial system has been challenged in a
vital race against time, and though we are a nation with a tremendous
industrial capacity, plans are formulating for new peaks in defense
production in the very near future.
The tempo of modern vrar, as vrell as its changes and develop-
ments to new and scientific methods, has created new problems from the
industrial point of view. The military problem has become an industri-
al problem, and the strength of a nation's armed forces is limited by
the maximiun utilization of the available natural resources, by industry,
within the shortest time possible.
The needs of a mechanized army are divided into two classes;
namely, mobility supplies and v/ar equipment supplies. The mobility
supplies are those which insure the movement of men and consist of
water, food, and fuel, while the yrar equipment supplies are those which
equip or assist men and machines for battle; namely, ammunition, spare
parts, gasoline and lubricants.
The vital part which industry plays in modern war is to sup-
ply the army with these materials in sufficient quantities when they
are needed," It is estimated by Colonel G, C. Shaw in his book Supply
in Modern War that a mechanized brigade of two thousand three hxindred
and forty-six men requires the following per day:**
*See Appendix A, B, C,
**ShaAT, Colonel G. C,, Supply in Modern War, Faber & Faber, 1939

Mobility Supplies
Water, Food, Fuel 81 Tons
Gasoline and Oil (1,84
tons per mile) 76 Tons
War Equipment Supplies
Ammunition 140 Tons
Railroad Trains to Move Brigade 14
Ship Tons for Overseas 25,000
If the United States is to train and equip an army of foxir mil-
lion men, the tremendous task of furnishing them according to the above
figures would reach staggering totals.
Food, Ylater 138,000 Tons
Gasoline and Oil 129,580 Tons
Ammunition 238,700 Tons
In addition to the above requirements, the nation must furnish
the navy and the airforce vfith the necessary equipment and supplies and
meet the normal needs of the civilian population.
During the first World War the United States required six men
in factories for every soldier in the field while today it is estimated
that Germany is using eighteen men in industry for each soldier,* This
startling comparison serves to illustrate the increased importance of
industry in modern warfare and substantiates the theory that the outcome
of wars may not be determined solely by the soldier but by industry. In
order to insure victory the modern army must be equipped with hundreds
of articles of every description, and its supplies must continue to flow
from the factories to the battlefield in a never ending stream,**
The introduction and importance of aerial bombardment of the
nation's vital supply areas brings to us the important problem of
* Popular Science Monthly
,
November, 1940, p. 82
** See Appendix A, B, C
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maintaining industrial production imder war conditions at maximxnn capacity.
It is argued that the acquisition of Western-hemisphere air bases and the
construction of a two-ocean navy will be sufficient to protect our shores
from any foreign invader. The validity of this theory cannot be denied,
but we are moving in a changing world. Things which were thought impos-
sible have happened, and a bombardment of our industrial areas in the
future is possible. If ours is to be a complete defense, all the possi-
bilities must be taken into consideration to prevent chaos or defeat in
a national emergency.
The localization of industry in the United States creates a
defense problem which will require a great deal of planning and some
intelligent action. Military aiithorities recognize that the vulnerability
of important industrial areas, particularly to air attack, increases daily.
Bombers are now being designed and constructed which can fly across the
ocean and back without refueling, and it is admitted that the complete
protection of a given area is not always possible. The importance of in-
dustry in war has been demonstrated and the mobilization of manpower alone
is not sufficient to insure complete defense. The mechanization of modern
armies is complete, only so long as industrial production keeps the army
supplied with its mechanical appliances, supplies, and food.
Factors Influencing Industrial Location
The location of industry cannot be said to be haphazard. As a
general rule, industry has economic reasons for its location; and even
if a superficial examination shows an uneconomic location, one will
usually find that some important economic factor had some influence in
the choice of location. Changing economic conditions sometimes make
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it appear desirable for an industry to move, but although change is con-
stant, sometimes the economic advantages to be gained in relocation can-
not be justified by the expense involved in transferring operations.
The development of the Atlantic seaboard from an industrial
point of view was a natural result of colonization. The ocean vms the
most convenient means of transportation, and naturally, people settled
wherever it was convenient and economical, V/ith the increase in popula-
tion there were developments in transportation and communication, and the
mill or factory gradually began to take the place of the home craftsman.
The location of these industries was deterained primarily by the povrer
factor, and many modern factories still operate on the sites once occu-
pied by small mills. With the introduction of steam power and the greater
developments in transportation the movement of industry began. Many re-
gard this movement as decentralization, but it is not what is regarded as
strictly decentralization from the defense viewpoint.
Industry expanded over a wide area, but certain industries tended
to localize. If raw materials were the economic factor which determined
the choice of location, then all industries interested in the important
factor moved in its direction and the entire industry was locatsfl within
a relatively small space or localized. Many industries once they are lo-
cated have remained near the soiorce of raw material long after the supply
has been exhausted.
The principal causes of the localization of industry are not nu-
merous, and though industry locates principally for one reason, other fac-
tors may soon become prominent so that the original reason for a location
is superseded by some other which was of less importance. Industry has
a tendency to locate near other like industries within local geographic

areas even though it might seem that it would be more advantageous to lo-
cate in some area where there is less concentration of similar industries.
Examples of this tendency can he seen within our ovm city by noting the lo
cation of the wholesale shoe district, jewelers, lav/yers, automobile
dealers, hotels, and hundreds of businesses which group together.
Many industries have found it important to locate near seaports
because it was most economical to do so. If it is advantageous for a busi
ness to use ocean transportation or if it finds that it imports its raw
material and exports its finished product, the location near the means of
transportation is found to be convenient. In some cases, such as the ship
building industry, it is impossible to locate in any other location, al-
though even here there have been cases where ships were constructed inland
in sections and then transported overland and assembled on the coast.
The nearness of the market which is supplied has many times in-
fluenced the location of a particular industry. As population moves west-
ward some industries tend to follow, particularly if transportation costs
of the finished product are fairly high. A striking example of the ten-
dency may be given by citing the manufacture of agricultural machinery.
VJ'e find that New England was the agricultural center of the country, and
Massachusetts and Connecticut were the locations principally chosen by
manvifacturers of farm m.achinery. Today, the leading agricultural machin-
ery factories are located at Chicago and St. Louis v;here they are in the
center of their market; namely, the farm states of the country.
Perhaps the most important factor determining the choice of lo-
cation of industry is the power supply. Although its importance has de-
creased in many industries because of cheap electric power, efficient
steam plants, and Diesel engines, its im.portance in many industries
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continues to be a determining factor. If we travel thoughout New England
we can still see the importance of water power as a prime mover of indus-
trial machinery. Our cotton mills, paper mills, and many small factories
take advantage of the many rivers and streams although they have avixiliary
steam plants or use purchased power when the principal available source
fails or is insiifficient for peak production. Water power is still one
of the most economical forms of power available, and its importance is in-
creased through government construction of dams for flood control, irriga-
tion, and navigation. The water power itself may not have value, for many
firms, but the hydro-electric power produced at economical rates is a
favorable attraction. Examples of power as a contributing factor in the
location of industry is the Alcoa plant near the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity power dam and the proposed aluminum plant to be constructed at
Massena, Vermont, if the St. Lawrence waterv/ay project is approved and a
power station is built.
Although coal and oil are today important sources of power,
m.odern methods of transportation have made the location of the industry
using it xmimportant from the viewpoint of the power source. The use of
electric furnaces in the steel industry, however, may eventually have
some affect on the use of coal as a source of power for that industry,
but it is doubtful whether it will achieve much importance, because hydro-
electric power seems more economical for electric smelting, at the present
time, than steam-generated power.
The lack of transportation facilities and communications may
have determined the location of industry in the past, but this no longer
is true. We find that motor trucks travelling over well-constructed
roads can penetrate into every corner of the country and in combination

with the railroads give fast and econoinical transportation. It seems that
the only limits placed upon the quantity or size of merchandise which can
be transported are the state laws regulating the weight which may be car-
ried on each axle. If it v^ere possible to operate larger and heavier
trucks on our highvmys, the manufacturers are in a position to build them.
It can be readily seen that at least one factor governing the location of
industry has been for practical purposes eliminated,
A very important part in the location of industry has been
determined by natural resources. The greatest example of this type of
location is the steel industry. The importance of coal, limestone, and
ore has encouraged the industry to concentrate v/here these raw materials
are in abundance. It is true that iron ore can be carried economically
long distances, but the amount of coal used per ton of ore does not
make it quite so profitable to transport the coal so the most economical
method has been selected, namely, that of bringing the least expensive
to the one v;hich would necessarily entail a higher cost.
Local investments and local prestige have been important in
industrial location. People who invested money liked to place it in lo-
cal enterprises where it could be watched. Today, with large capital in-
vestments made through stock exchanges and spread over many industries
and localities, the importance of local investments has diminished.
People no longer invest their capital locally but place it where they
believe they can secure maximum yield at a minimum risk, and the "person-
al touch" which -people desired in their investments no longer exists.
Local prestige still is somewhat of importance - a jewelry concern still
likes to locate in Attleboro, Providence or New York because those are
known to be the jewelry manufacturing centers of the country. It makes
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a firm seem important if it locates where other similar firms are lo-
cated.
An important factor in the location of industry has been the
topography of the soil and the climate. These tvro geographical charac-
teristics are important primarily in the moving picture industry. In
the case of other types of industry they are no longer of paramount im-
portance, as technological itrprovements in lighting, air conditioning,
and the use of electric power have practically displaced the industrial
benefits which could be secured by locating on a hillside beside a river,
or in a location where there is a damp climate or more sunshine per year
than any other locality.
The most recent and perhaps most important factors governing
the location of industry in recent years have been division of manufac-
ture and an abundant labor supply. Although specialization in the divi-
sion of manufacturing processes and modern m.achines has decreased the
quantity of skilled artisans, we find that many industries have had to
locate where skilled labor was abundant. The machine has released the
importance of labor in many industries by performing many intricate and
involved operations, and mass production and the division of labor has
permitted the use of less skilled labor. In the opposite direction we
find that complicated machinery needs a highly trained and skilled worker
to construct and operate the machines; thus, industries locate where the
type of worker they require can be more readily found.
The division of manufacttiring into specialized units and the
utilization of by-products have a great influence on industrjr. Many small
industries supply materials for some large industn''. as, for example, the
automobile industry at Detroit. There v/e find hundreds of small factories.
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making nuts, bolts, small parts, instruments, etc, to be used by the
larger manvifacturers in making their automobiles. Many industries
have scrap, waste or by-products which attract industries to reprocess
or convert the scrap into usable products. There are many instances
where a by-product industry may become more important than the many
industries which supply its rav/ materials.
Industrial Concentration in the United State s
Recognizing that certain economic factors have influenced
the location of industry it is logical to turn our attention to an
analysis of the manufacturing facilities which exist within the nation.
Except for the East North Central area, we find that there is a high
concentration along the coast line which is very susceptible to both
air and sea operations. This vulnerability of industrial areas to
modern methods of attack causes a great deal of uneasiness in the
minds of both military and industrial leaders because a large portion
of the nation's industrial capacity can be paralyzed with a fev/ effec-
tive attacks by a potential enemy. The destruction or control of one
vital industry or the disruption of production of som.e essential ma-
terial may jeopardize or result in the complete collapse of our entire
defensive (or offensive) military plans. The proximity of New England
to Europe places it in a highly dangerous position because it can be
attacked simultaneously by sea and by aircraft operating from Canadian
bases as well as land forces which might successfully invade Canada
in the remote future.
An analysis of population distribution, wage earners, wages
and value of products produced serves as the most effective barometer
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6f industrial capacity within specified areas. The following figures
are based on the 1930 census of 122,775,046 population and the 1935
census of manufactiires.
Geographical Distribution of Population,
Wage Jobs, Wages and Value of Products (l)(2)
Percentage Percentage of Value of
Distribution of Wage Earners Wages* Products
Section Population (1930) (1935) (1935) (1935)
The North 59.5 74,4 5,754 34,600
New England 56,7 12.3 894 3,900
Middle Atlantic 21.4 28.6 2,200 12,800
East North Central 20.6 28.6 2,400 14,500
West North Central 10,8 4,9 360 3,400
The South 30.8 19,6 1,072 7,500
South Atlantic 12.8 11,6 650 4,100
East South Central 8.1 4.3 234 1,500
West South Central 9.9 3.7 188 1,900
The Vfest 9.7 6,0 475 3,500
Mountain 3.0 0.9 75 600
Pacific 6.7 5.1 400 2,900
East of the Mississippi 69,6 85.4 6,378 36,800
West of the Mississippi 30.4 14,6 1,023 8,800
In Millions of Dollars
A suntmary** of the previous figures shows that within 14^!^
of the nation's total area 69,5% of the nation's wage earners are lo-
cated, and 66^ of the nation's manufacturing value is produced. Seven
states, namely. New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Massachusetts,
Michigan, and New Jersey have 57^ of the wage jobs or 4,217,700 wage
earners (1935 figures) and 74^ of the total wage bill of the nation.
** Woods, Kalph M., America Reborn (1939), p. 74
(1) See Appendix D
(2) (Population percentage) McKenzie, Roderick D., The Metropolitan
Community (New York, 1933)
(Figures of Percentage of V^age Earners, TJ'ages, Value of Products)
America Reborn
,
by Ralph M. Woods. (1939) p. 53.

-11-
Within this limited area in 1933 the following percentages of national
production existed within certain industries: (l)
Printing and Publishing 68.2 IV Iron and Steel 84,8 I
Woolens and Worsteds 93.2 IV Hardware 96,0 I
Electrical Machinery 94.4 III Boots and Shoes 82.1 IV
Motor Vehicles 90.1 I Meat Packing 52.4 I
Clothing 78.0 IV Cigars - Cigarettes 58.5 IV
Chemicals and allied products 62.9 I or IV
Engines and Tvirbines 86.9 I or III
(Roman ntmierals indicate importance in defense)
This concentration may not be strictly regarded as critical
from a military point of viev; because it can be argued that the above
list does not include all the industries which are essential to national
defense and it includes "Ivixury" industries which would not affect the
nation's military strength. It must be further recognized that the
figures are for "peacetime" production and they naturally do not in-
clude government arsenals and shipyards which were, at that time, very
far from operation on a twenty-four hour basis. Any figures or statis-
tics must be regarded as indicators of trends and conditions, and it
must be recognized that at full operation on a war basis there might
be startling changes in statistical summaries. We must recognize that
for the production of war equipment and supplies the nation must rely
on the areas where productive facilities exist and any changes under
war production would tend to show a greater concentration of essential
industries within the areas as manxifacturers change their plants from
"peacetime" production to war supplies.
By a further examination of the preceding table of Class I
industries (those most vital to defense) a more alarming situation is
discovered. In the twelve industrial divisions listed at least six
(l) See Appendix B
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industries may be classified as Class I and these represent at least
50% of the nation* s production within the limited area of seven states.
Every other industry listed has some hearing in national defense (see
list in Appendix A) which must not he disregarded, and each one*s per-
centage of production exceeds F>0% of the nation's capacity for the in-
dustry, (There is a difficulty in comparing the above table to the
industrial classifications of the War Industries Board of the last- war
because census statistics ar^ not summarized in detail according to
classifications of the Board and many Class I industries are not re-
ported in detail or they are included in some general classification
which cannot be analyzed as completely as desired.)
Parallel v^-ith the problem of industrial concentration, we
find that a similar condition exists when we study the density of popu-
lation. People representing manpower, economic wealth, and productive
capacity congregate in those areas where the economic resources and
development are most abimdant, Where one finds industry one also finds
people, and the two are so interdependent on each other that they make
our military as well as industrial problems more acute and our plans
more complicated. One half of the population of the United States lives
in Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connec-
ticut, New York, Nevf Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, Ohio,
Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan and the District of Columbia,
The extent of concentration can be recognized by noting that in an
area com.prising 4^ of the nation* s area ZT/o of the population is lo-
cated. The population per square mile in this area is as follows:*
Woods, Ralph L,, America Reborn (New York), page 52; based on
United States Population Census - 1930,
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Rhode Island 644.3
New Jersey 537,8
Massaohusetts 528,6
Connect ioub 333,4
New York 262.4
Pennsylvania 214,8
Average for above 148
Nation as a whole 41
Thus we find that both the concentration and interdependence
of industry and population create similar problems which are interre-
lated because without industry modern: military campaigns cannot be car-
ried on and mobilization implies the complete utilization of all econo-
mic resources tovrard a definite goal. The concentration of population
has been one of the most important factors in determining the localiza-
tion of industry and it creates the greatest problem when we focus our
attention on the problems of decentralization,
A duplication of the localization which exists in the geo-
graphical areas of the country often can be found to exist within each
of the geographical areas. One often finds that the bulk of the manu-
facturing facilities of a particular industry is located within a com-
paratively small radius, and this centralization is carried out in
greater detail when one analyzes the plant locations within the confines
of states and finds that a major portion of each particular industry is
mainly located within one city.
For representative exsunples of such centralization, five in-
dustries have been selected for analysis to show the centralization
which exists within areas and these have been further analyzed, insofar
as possible, to give representative examples of localization within the
state. For obvious reasons it is impossible to detemiine the size or
productive capacity of the plants within the industry, but the illustrations

-14-
of concentration mast he regarded as a dangerous condition no matter
how large the size of the plants or the quantity of their productive
capacity, (It must he noted that the production figures do not rep-
resent maximum capacity; however, they are taken from the 1937 census,
which is considered to be a normal year representing the recovery phase
of the business cycle.) (Later figures are not yet available at this
time)
For purposes of this regional analysis the following Class I
industries (vital to national defense) are analyzed in somewhat greater
detail: petroleum, aircraft, steel works and rolling mills, firearms,
and machine-tool industries. The tables* for these five industries
illustrate that within a specified geographical area, one or two states
often contain the greater portion of the industry.
Petroleum Steel Work and Rolling Mill Products
No, of Value of No. of Value of
Firms Products Firms Products
United States 365 1^2,546 , 745,730 United States 410 s^3, 330, 491, 150
Arkansas 5 14,383,526 California 19 38,276,772
California 57 356,097,585 Illinois 37 287,207,667
Illinois 11 115,545,654 Indiana 18 356,646,436
Indiana 6 190,332,763 Michigan 20 130,888,132
Kansas 18 102,490,429 Missouri 8 21,727,059
Kentucky 7 20,954,056 New Jersey 12 42,758,066
Louisiana 12 122,151,945 New York 22 157,809,733
Michigan 9 21,999,689 Ohio 64 733,351,272
Montana 16 10,892,921 Oregon 3 1,787,641
New Jersey 8 216,284,099 Pennsylvania 131 1,109,843,163
New Mexico 7 3,431,417 Washington 5 4,780,818
New York 7 46,009,784 Y/est Virginia 8 93,053,845
Ohio 13 97,297, 783 Wisconsin 12 21,860,979
Oklahoma 30 144,474,915 Other States 51 330,499,567
Pennsylvania 33 259,626,775
Texas 79 689,625,304
Vfest Virginia 3 11,607,874
Wyoming 22 29,993,494
Other States 22 93,475,713
United States Census of Manufactures - 1937
States underlined further analyzed as to industrial location
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Firearms
No. of Value of
Firms Products
United States 21" $ 21,554,870
Connecticut 7 11,857,653
Massachusetts T 3,634,372
New York 5 5,829,552
Other States 5 233,293
Aircraft
No.of Value of
Firms Products
United States 92 |106,568,00'0
California 24 51,863,046
Indiana 3 33,735
Kansas 5 2,415,776
Missouri 5 870,355
New York 17 15,515,923
Ohio 13 2,137,710
Pennsylvania 7 2,002,890
Other States 18 31,729,019
Maohine-Tool Industries
No .of Value of
Firms Products
United States
California 5 $ 120,567
Connecticut 24 29,115,574
Illinois 35 26,778,179
Indiana 11 7,414,004
Massachusetts 26 22,227,818
IfichTgan 24 12,144,451
Minnesota 5 458,592
Missouri 5 1,019,154
Nevr Jersey- 8 1,979,684
New York 18 14,145,180
Ohio 69 80,111,824
Pennsylvania 23 15,504,489
Vermont 5 10,100,455
Wisconsin 21 12,645,401
Other States 13 26,477,446
A further analysis of one or two of these states shows the
concentration to be carried out still further when one consults the
national business directories,*
Petroleum
Kansas, according to our table, has eighteen refineries,
nine of which are located at Witchita Falls, (50%)
Texas has seventy-nine refineries, eight of these being
located at Dallas, (10?^)
Arkansas has four plants at El Dorado out of five located
in the state. (80^)
Massachusetts has two, both at Boston. (100/^)
Fireanns
Of seven firms in Connecticut, three are in New Haven, (42,8°'^)
Massachusetts has four firms, two of which are relatively
close - one at Springfield, one at Chicopeo. (50^)
Machine Tools
Of twenty-six machine-tool firms located in Massachusetts,
twelve are located in Worcester.
*McRae*s Blue Book American Business 1940
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Airoraft
Of tvrenty-four firms in California, three are located at
Burbank; tvro are located at San Diego, and the remainder
are distributed one per city.
Stee l Works
Pennsylvania - sixty-four of the one hundred and thirty-one
firms are located at Pittsburg. (49^)
Although some concentration is unavoidable and some indus-
tries seem to be adequately distributed within their state lines, it
must be recognized that from the aerial viev^point the location in tovms
within a limited area makes the concentration serious, because a para-
lysis of industry by military attack does not necessarily affect a
single city but it can be of sufficient extension as to affect an en-
tire county, state or region.
It must also be taken into consideration that if a certain
area within the nation is completely controlled by a hostile power, the
loss in the productive capacity may be sufficient to seriously affect
the safety of the entire nation. For example, if the State of Califor-
nia were controlled by an invading army, or enemy aircraft succeeded
in systematically destroying the twenty-four aircraft factories lo-
cated there, the loss in producti^-e capacity could be so great as to
seriously affect the safety of the entire nation.
In suuanarizing v.'-e may safely say that available statistics
indicate that there is a dangerous concentration of industry, and the
existence of an unbalanced condition in the nation cannot be denied.
The data which are available for study cannot be accepted as totally
accurate because it must be remembered that it can be analyzed only
within the meager limitations of census reports and manrrfacturing
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statistics; and it is difficult, if not totally impossible, to secure
statistics on vital defense industries or to secure data of actual
production under the pressure of "national emergency," Furthermore,
classifications of various statistical sources vary betv^een govern-
mental departments, and many industries whose normal production is
classified as "nonessential to defense" transform their facilities
to vmr-time production on a v/ar basis and thus our statistics are no
longer a true indication of actual conditions. It must also be taken
into consideration that some industries have a high value of finished
products and a low employment figure, v/'hile others have a high em-
ployment figure and a relatively low product value.
If vre recognize that discrepancies exist and content our-
selves with averages which reflect general conditions vrhich exist in
the various sections of our countrj'-, we will have the most accurate
barometer which is available under the circixmstances , The combined
use of percentages of population, wage earners, and value of manu-
facture serve as indicators of the location of the nation's productive
facilities.
In time of war the areas which produce and employ most in
time of peace naturally will have the greatest capacity for m.ilitary
supplies and equipment, and a "peace-time concentration" will continue
to exist or become even more acute in times of national emergency.
Admitting that the nation's resources are more or less "all
in one basket" and that very little can be done to change the location
of industrial production, we must turn our attention to making the
best of a bad situation. Our hopes of future security must be based

upon the slim chance that vre will have time to rearm to a sufficient
degree that if that fateful day should ever come vre may be sufficiently
armed to defend the northeastern area from attack or invasion and thus
assure continued production of supplies and equipment for our military
forces.
Having recognized that a dangerous situation exists in regard
to the location of industry, one naturally seeks the answer to the
question of :vhat is to he done. At the present time no extensive de-
centralization can be undertaken, except where new plants are contem-
plated, because v^e are in a race against time^ and maximum production of
defense materials must be attained with the least delay. To hamper
the maximum utilization of our present facilities is national suicide:
therefore, we must protect our means of production to the best of our
ability until such a time as complete decentralization becomes practical.
The Defense of Industrial Areas
The first line of national defense for our congested coastal
areas is the navy. It is necessary for the nairy to engage in offensive
operations for the defense of our shores in order to prevent the enemy
from launching a combined sea, air and land attack on our coastal cities.
The acquisition of air and sea bases substantially increases the range
of operation of a modern battle fleet and thus instires the more effective
protection of a nation»s mainland, and the effectiveness of scouting
as well as naval maneuvers is increased tremendously.
The creation of an Atlantic squadron which will be increased
to the size of a fleet is an important step in defending our most vul-
nerable industrial area. Present plans call for the contruction, within
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the next five years, of vessels ranging from 45,000 ton battleships to
400 small "E" boats*. This plan may be said to be the most intelli-
gent action that can be undertaken under present conditions and should
serve to sufficiently defend our shores until a superior fleet can be
built, or concentrated by a combination of enemies. Unless our sea
forces are severely crippled or destroyed, it is difficult, if not
totally impossible, for an invader to operate effectively within strik-
ing distance of our shores.
The elimination of our navy would present a serious situation
to the productive facilities of the nation. It would mean that the
air arm of a hostile fleet operating from concealed or protected car-
rier ships could effectively attack objectives within a radius of two
hundred fifty to five hundred miles, and cities and seaports might not
entirely escape shelling by the heavier vessels operating in coastal
waters. Though effective defense can be carried out by the strategic
location of coast defense guns, mine fields, and the scouting opera-
tions of "E" boats, aircraft, submarines and auxilliary vessels, these
defense operations only serve as barriers to the landing of hostile
troops, but they cannot prevent a curtailment of manufacturing activity.
The complete destruction of our coastal cities by naval forces would be
a difficult operation by sea but combined with the airplane destructive
results of sufficient magnitude could possibly be attained.
The protection of factories from air attack has presented
one of the major military problems of modern war and the location of
our manufacturing facilities makes the problem still more acute. There
are three methods of protecting factories from aerial attack. These
Fast motor boats equipped with four torpedoes and used for coastal de?
fense and scouting operations.
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methods may be said to be throxigh location, anti-aircraft gun emplace-
ments, and lastly, the use of interceptor planes to harass or turn
back the enemy. Under our present system and the race against time
the location of existing facilities cannot be changed. One cannot
readily move a large factory to a terrain which because of its moun-
tains, mists, etc., and other geographical factors limits visibility
from the air. It is equally difficult to camouflage modern buildings
or to transfer a major portion of their activity undergro^And, Regard-
ing onr present manufacturing facilities, the first and perhaps most
effective method of defense is out of the question.
Ttirning our attention to the second method commonly employed
we are faced with an equally difficult problem. Modern war has shown
us that effective concentrations of anti-aircraft fire harass the at-
tacker to such an extent that he fails to reach his objective or forces
him to maneuver to such an extent that his aim is poor and the destruc-
tion is limited. The difficulty with this method of defense is that
in our cities the targets are so closely grouped that a bomb dropped in
a haphazard manner is apt to be just as effective as one aimed at a
specific target.
The last method, namely, that of using interceptor planes,
is the most effective method which can be employed; but again our in-
dustrial locations, in a majority of cases, affect the degree of com-
plete protection which such a protective system should provide. The
effective operation of this system requires the division of the area
to be protected into squares which are located on maps at a district
headquarters and a number of air fields located at advantageous points.
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Lookout posts are provided at strategic positions tliroughout the area,
and warnings are reported to headquarters as attacking planes pass over
each post. The proper operation of this system requires distances of
from sixty to one himdred miles intervening between the time an enemy
plane is first sighted and it reaches its objective. This period of
tirre is estimated to be the minimum time necessary to chart the loca-
tion of the attacking aircraft and to order out defending aircraft,
A recent further development of this system of defense pro-
vides certain posts in an area to be equipped with radio listening de-
vices which locate the radio beam used by bombers for the purpose of
reaching their o>^jective. The plotting of the planers course by m.eans
of the radio beam by tvro listening stations indicates on a map the
probable objective to be attacked, .and necessary defensive preparations
can be undertaken several minutes before the enemy latinches the attack.
The use of either of these methods is designed to determine the at-
tacker's course, altitude, and other technical data at a central point
and then to coordinate interceptor planes and anti-aircraft batteries
in such a manner as to secure the maximum results possible by inter-
rupting the attacker's plans before he reaches his intended target.
The effectiveness of this method of defense has been found
practical, but since it takes from five to fifteen minutes for a plane
to leave its base and gain sufficient altitude (depending upon the type
of plane, its readiness for departvire, and its distance from attackers)
for combat, it may be readily seen that timely warning is the essence
of a successful operation of this plan. In an interval of fifteen
minutes a modern bomber can cover as much as one hundred miles; therefore^
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it is imperative that all calculations be made in minutes or even
seconds.
Many of our industrial centers are located too near the coast
line for this system of defense to operate successfully, and the nvimber
of available air fields near our factories is limited. The importance
of the location of industry can readily be seen as an acute problem,
particularly if our navy failed to hold an invader avray from our shores.
An immediate curtailment of essential war production would result
as soon as an enemy based his aircraft (either on land bases or aircraft
carriers) within a few hours from our New England coast.
With a curtailment in the production of vital necessities and
a weakening of the morale of the civilian population, the effectiveness
of the army to repel attack would be hampered and an enemy force might
establish a "bridgehead" on our coasts and quickly secure control of a
major portion of our industrial area. Once the arm.y is deprived of
its supplies for mobility and battle, it quickly disintegrates, and
it would be necessafy to abandon the campaign and our nation would be
lost.
The immediate future holds a gloomy outlook particularly for
New England and the Middle Atlantic states as v;ell as the southern
coast line, but our naval, military and air programs will provide the
maximum defense under adverse conditions. A large and modern navy with
strategic bases can bear the brunt of any attack and prevent the move-
ment of sufficient men and materials to permit a military campaign
against the industrial sections of our country. A powerful air force,
properly equipped and strategically based can effectively prevent.
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at least for the next fev.'- years, air attacks of serious consequence.
Canada's friendliness provides us with a potential ally to the north,
and a cultivation of South American neighbors should provide a fair
degree of safety to the south. Except for nuisance raids by enemy air-
craft our industrial centers can be effectively protected by pursuing
our present military and economic program, and once the nation is fully
armed there is less to fear from a lack of armaments but more to fear
from possible attack. The course of the present conflict will determine,
within the next fev; months, to what degree of danger our factories and
resources will be exposed, but a systei; of decentralization (as dis-
cussed later) must be recognized as a part of our futxire industrial
plans regardless of the outcome of present hostilities. In modern
war, events move fast and changes in methods and equipment are start-
ling. One never knows what the future months or years may bring, but
it is wise to prepare for the future and attempt to anticipate condi-
tions which may exist several years hence.
Civil ian Problems in Urban Areas
In addition to the problem of supplying our armed forces, we
must remem.ber that the civilian population must be insured maximum em-
ployment and the necessities of life in sufficient quantities to insure
a maximum output in terms of productive capacity. A localized condition
of industrial activity does not always permit the civilian population
to work at maximum capacity, and in time of stress the morale may tend
to drop far below what it would under decentralized conditions. The
concentrated targets existing in congested areas affect productive capa-
city in two Y/ays. First, the chances of "direct hits" on military
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objectives are increased and the resulting time lost vj-hile repairs
are effected can never be regained. Secondly, the total working tine
lost during air raids is greater, because during a raid over a single
objective a larger amoimt of workers will cease operations. Thus, if
100 hours per month had to be spent in air raid shelters by 10,000
workers, the loss in production and working time would be greater than
if only 500 workers were affected.
In congested areas loss by aerial bombs is greater and the
loss of life rises in proportion to the degree of congestion. This
results in a lowered morale among the working people whose homes, rela-
tives, and places of employment are destroyed, and a direct loss to the
nation through the destruction of manpower by explosions, fire, famine,
and disease. The factor of increased fatigue, due to lack of rest, is
introduced by more frequent raids over congested areas: and the disrup-
tion of communications, transportation, and public services affects the
individual's productivity as well as his morale. The destruction of
warehouses, housing, and water supply systems creates greater problems
in highly congested areas because of the dependence of the population
upon the various services which they are accustomed to receive. The
use of governmental emploi^/ment agencies can immediately reassign workers
to nevr positions in order to permit the individuals to continue working
with a minimum of delay, while the problem.s of food and housing shortages
can usually be worked out satisfactorily in emergencies. It must be
recognized that vrhere localization exists, it v/ill be virtually an im-
possibility to have sxifficient quantities of all the necessities of
life at all times, and privation and suffering will be necessarily more
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aoute in such areas. Examples of the helplessness of large cities can
be noted by recalling the food and transportation shortages during floods,
hurricanes, or strikes, and the impossibility of securing transportation
to areas where the necessary articles could be found. The inxjonvenience
which was felt by city dwellers under these conditions would increase
many times under war conditions.
The Transportation Problem
There must be a uniform f lov; of raw materials into the fac-
tories for processing and a reversal of the procedure for the finished
product. Many vital raw materials classified as "strategic materials"
are secured from Japan, China, the Indies, Africa, Russia, the Philli-
pines, and Italyj these include tungsten, antimony, mica, silk, coconut
shells, manila fiber, tin, quinine, rubber, mercury, manganese, and
chroniiim.* A nwal blockade could prevent the procurement of these
essential products, so the National Defense Advisory Commission, the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the Procurement Division of the
Treasury are collaborating in the purchase of stocks of these neces-
sary materials. In addition to this activity, substitutes for the es-
sential products are being developed and local sources for similar mate-
rials are being exploited.
One may well ask what all this has to do with the location of
industry. It naturally develops into a problem of transportation. In
time of national emergency the transportation facilities of any nation
are taxed beyond capacity. The concentration of industry within a given
Popular Science Monthly
,
December, 1940, p, 76-77

-26-
area causes congestion, delays and eventually a disruption of production
schedules, A lack of raw materials causes waste in manpo^ver and produc-
tive capacity, and the strength of the armed forces is weakened accord-
ingly. Wherever possible a location closer to its source of rav;- mate-
rials may provide material benefits by decreasing the time lost in trans-
portation and by releasing carriers (either water, rail or truck) for
other important work.
Under present conditions it is necessary for the government to
provide storage facilities for these strategic raw materials in readily
accessible places for those industries which require them because an
overtaxed transportation system cannot be depended upon when it operates
beyond capacity. The construction or use of warehouses in our industrial
areas again makes us recognize that "we have all ovir eggs in one basket,"
The destruction of several warehouses of strategic war materials might
be ;5ust as important a military success as destroying a factory, for if
raw materials are not available for processing then the factory ceases
to have military value and the all important elements of manpoxver and
productive capacity are idle.
Localization of industry also supplies problems in furnishing
an army in the field with its finished products. Modern wars are wars
principally of movement, and the effectiveness of a fighting force is
directly affected by its ability to receive supplies and equipment on
time. In the World Wai; ships could be unloaded in comparative safety
and railroad lines could be operated practically to the battle line.
The introduction of the airplane has permitted the destruction of per-
manent lines of communication, and it has become a more difficult problem

to maintain the flow of materials from the factory to the scene of mili-
tary operations. With localized industry, materials must be transported
to a railhead sometimes hundreds of miles from the point of operations
and then transported to movable bases where supplies and materials are
further distributed to the military units requiring them. The longer the
distance between factories and railheads, the greater are the possibili-
ties that air attack will disrupt the lines of communication.
Assuming that a military force is operating in one of the
western states against a hostile power, it would find it necessary to de-
pend upon much of its material from the eastern section of the coxintry.
Long range enemy bombers could destroy bridges over the Mississippi and
hinder the free movement of materials and supplies. The invader might
be in a position to cut off the defending forces or destroy them due to
an inability of the defenders to maintain contact vrith the industrial
area. The location of at least one plant, under sucV conditions, west of
the Mississippi might mean the difference betiveen viubory and defeat.
The importance of maintaining our transportation system in opera
tion at all costs can be recognized by a few glaring examples of the dif-
ficulties which must be met under our present system. It is not uncom-
mon to find brass goods manufactured in Connecticut from copper mined in
Arizona and refined and smelted in New Jersey. The finished products may
then journey to Michigan for installation in motor cars. Wheat is grown
in Kansas, milled in Minneapolis, and then shipped to all sections of the
country. Silk is transported from the Orient to San Francisco, to our
New Jersey factories for manufacturing, to New York for processing, and
then back to the West Coast for consumption. Similar conditions exist
with a thousand and one items both vital to defense and necessary to the
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civilian population. We find ourselves concerned not only with the econo-
mic criticism of a wasteful system but a tragic condition vrhich seriously
affects our national security. The interdependence of the country's geo-
graphical areas causes concern regarding the maintenance of transporta-
tion.
An analysis of the merchandise moved during the year 1938 within
the nation shows the relative importance of the various means of transpor-
tation.
Volume of Intercity Traffic by Kinds of Transportation*
Miles Percent
1938 of Total
Agency Millions 1938
Railways - Steam and Electric 292,510 62.82
Trucks
:
For Hire 17,500 3.76
Private 22,500 4.83
Total 40,000 8.59
Inland Waterways 66,746 14,33
Oil Pipe Lines 66,400 14.26
Air Carriers 10 .01
Although it is impossible to determine how much merchandise is
handled back and forth over the same route, it must be recognized that
localized industry necessarily causes a large amount of uneconomic hand-
ling and transportation. The speed with which freight can be dispatched
from one section of the country to another has a direct bearing upon the
nation's production and security. Delayed shipments can easily result
in idle men and machines, disrupted production schedules, and a weaken-
ing of the striking power and effectiveness of our military forces as
Interstate Commerce Commission Report-1939
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well as suffering and privation for the population of our large cities
whose very existence depends upon the adequacy of transportation.
It is impracticable to determine the future status of railroad
facilities under actual war as well as the extent to v^hich they may be
utilized. As a result of the experiences of the past war, a great deal
of criticism has been prevalent about the uncertainty and inefficiency
of railroad operation. It must be admitted, however, that the system
did not have the experience of an emergency and that there was very
little com.petition to force a more effective operation of the rail sys-
tem. The railways themselves blame their 1917-1918 dilemma upon the
use of freight cars for storage facilities and the resulting shortage
of rolling-stock. In spite of all the excuses which are offered for
past errors or shortcomings, we find that a combination of competition
and strict government control has placed the railroads in a position
where they are forced to operate as efficiently as possible.
Railvreiy officials are extremely optimistic of their ability to
handle any emergency which faces them within the next fev/ years . They
point vfith pride to the fact that they were able to move 40,000 men a day
in 1940 in August for summer maneuvers as compared with 20,000 men daily
in 1918, and that 60,000 carloads of lumber for the construction of army
camps were moved on schedule v/ithout delaying either construction or regu-
lar traffic,* It is impossible to predict hov/ satisfactorily the rail-
roads will operate in an emergency, but it can be stated for a fact that
they will endeavor to cope vfith any emergency in order to avoid govern-
ment supervision through the transportation division of the National
Saturday Evening Post : Association of American Railroads
,
Washington, D.C.
i-'ebruary 1941, p.
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Defense Advisory Board in place of actual govermnent operation in order
to assure prompt dispatch of shipments and prevent unnecessary transpor-
tation.
Rerouting of trains will, no doubt, be frequent and necessary,
and active measures will have to be taken to provide for quick or emer-
gency repairs to terminal facilities, switch yards, bridges and impor-
tant trunk lines. The hurricane of 1938 severely affected all transpor-
tation in the New England area and destruction in a modern war will prob-
ably be more extensive. The answer to the maintenance of railroad faci-
lities will be adequate repair equipment and trained crews. All the pro-
tection possible must be provided for our railroad system because it is
concentrated in direct proportion to our factories, and it will face its
share of destruction from air attack and saboteurs.
In national defense, railroads must bear the largest part of
the nation's traffic particularly if coastwise shipping is hampered by
enem.y activity. The emergency will, in addition to raising the rail-
road's proportionate share of all traffic carried, undoubtedly cause the
other systems commonly em.ployed to divert some of their share as speed
becomes param.oxmt and other means of transportation become unreliable.
Due to the fact that railroads are fixed in their location and limited to
operate on the established tracks and trunk lines, we may find that
delays will be frequent and freight may be severely delayed in trans-
continental shipments.
Our pipe lines may not be strictly regarded by some as a means
of transportation as they are relatively few and their use is limited, but
since they are an important means of moving essential commodities, our
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discussion must include these as means of transportation. The trans-
portation of oil and natural gas is extensively accomplished through the
use of this system, and our figures show that in time of emergency if
the operation of pipe lines continues without interruption, they release
other means of transportation from this important work. Like the rail-
roads, pipe lines represent fixed equipment; unlike the railroad lines,
however, they can be covered and pumping stations can he camouflaged from
air attack to a considerable degree. The greatest danger to this system
would lie in control of the territory through which the line runs by an
invader or by sabotage at some point along the route of travel. The im-
portance of this type of transportation cannot be denied, but it will
necessarily be limited to the maximtwi quantities for which the lines are
designed and to commodities in a liquid or gaseous state.
Our inland waterv^ays are theoretically regarded as one of the
most practical, dependable and economical means of transportation. It is,
however, favored by bulky commodities and lacks the speed vrhich other
systems of transportation enjoy. It has been found that if adequate pro-
tection can be provided for dams, locks and other facilities connected
with inland shipping, that destruction hy air attack of the natviral means
of transportation is practically impossible. The greatest hazards to in-
land shipping are encountered when bridges spanning rivers are destroyed
or when ships are sunk in the channel as a result of "direct hits."
Usually stoppages of this nature are temporary and the use of adequate
protective facilities in the inland areas minimizes the possibility and
effectiveness of this type of attack.
If v;e turn our attention to sea transportation, we find that the
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modern war policies of nations include a continued participation in
foreign trade insofar as possible, thus keeping the economic ties be-
tween nations as normal as conditions will permit. Unless an offensive
war is waged in another continent, the operation of vessels becomes
hazardous if not impractical. The necessity of continuing foreign trade
for the economic benefits vrhich will accrue after the cessation of hosti-
lities encourages the operation of vessels even under adverse conditions.
The western hemisphere is practically self-sufficient, but
until effective substitutes are found for vital materials, some foreign
trade must be carried on whenever possible. Our policy of protecting the
entire hemisphere makes some ocean travel necessary as all our neighbor-
ing nations are not self-sufficient in all commodities and their ability
to meet resistance has a direct bearing upon our oivn,
Otir expanding navy is the greatest assurance of the maintenance
of sea transportation, but our concentration of shipping and shipbuilding
facilities are a decided attraction to military conquerors. Although our
shipbuilding and terminal facilities for ocean-going vessels are distri-
buted along the coastline, we have a decided concentration in the Atlantic
seaboard. The concentration of industry has brought with it a concentra-
tion of shipping which must be protected, but complete protection cannot
be assured.
The use of mine fields, coast defense artillery and anti-airci*aft
emplacements are the usual means of protecting a harbor. Although they
can effectively prevent a military force from affecting a landing they
cannot prevent some destruction to shipping from heavy naval guns or
planes without prompt naval and air resistance by superior numbers. The

only guarantee to safe ocean shipping with minimum interruption is of-
fensive military action which keeps the attacker thousands of miles
away.
The construction of the St, Lawrence Vlaterv/ay will be an im-
portant step in encouraging the development of shipping in an inland or
protected area, but like all other plans it will take considerable time
for the approval and completion of the project. For the present, as in
many other activities concerning the national welfare we will find it
necessary to utilize our facilities to the greatest advantage and protect
them as well as we can.
In the use of highways and m.otor transportation we find a
growing method of transportation which is both flexible and economical.
Trucks have the advantages of speed, convenience, and economy. for most
types of hauling and they possess the additional advantage of not being
limited in their range of operation by a roadbed or extensive investments
in equipment and terminal facilities.
Tinlike some of the other systems of transportation, the motor
truck is never seriously affected by enemy attacks and might prove to
be the most dependable means of moving commodities in time of war. Due
to the fact that shipments are distributed over a large number of trucks,
losses tend to be sm.aller. The destruction of roads by air attack is
limited and repairs are comparatively easy to make. Trucks can be easily
detoured and, if actual invasion of an area is imminent, they can be
transferred avray from enemy operations and their services are not lost.
Up to the present time, the truck has been found economical
particularly in "short-haul" operations and as a means of feeding the
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railroads and steamship facilities. Its use in "long hauls" for certain
types of merchandise is slowly increasing, and as uniform state laws
covering truck weights and operation are enacted, further expansion of
operations over longer distances can be expected to increase.
Even though trucking has played an increasing part in the de-
velopment of transportation, there are certain factors which will tend
to limit the importance of this type of transportation. It can be stated
that its favourable influence to decentralization is important as evi-
denced by the fact that 124,329,000 families, or 7,844,609 people, repre-
senting 6,3% of the country's population, lacks railroad facilities and
is entirely served by trucks.* This group of people comprise an area of
122,473 commpnities of 48,492 counties, which represent an area of 39,6%
of the nation.* In an emergency, however, these people must continue to
relay on motor transportation, for industry will utilize available equip-
ment as feeders for other form.s of transportation, and the military forces
will make heavy demands on this type of transportation as soon as it be-
comes necessary to furnish military supplies to bases located at a dis-
tance from rail terminals.
The amount of hea^ry trucking equipment suitable for transcon-
tinental hauls is limited, and the quantities of material which can be
hauled cannot be impressive. The following table analyzes the nation's
equipment according to size and illustrates the limited importance which
trucking can have in a period of emergency;
Motor Facts
, Automobile Manufacturers Association, 1940.
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Truck Registrations in 1939
Classified According to Carrying Capacity*
Number Percent
Capacity of Unit e of Total
3/4 of ton or less 1,644,166 38,18
1 ton but less than 1^ 84,974 1.98
l-l tons but less than 2 2,247,219 52.27
2 tons but less than 2^ 132,935 3,09
2h tons but less than 3-| 108,490 2.52
3J tons but less than 5 44,138 1.03
5 tons or over
Total Commercial Units Registered
December 31, 1939) 4,299,000
Trucking cannot be considered to be expanded to the point where
it can displace the railroad as a major means of transportation, but it
should be regarded as a supplementary or atocilliary method which in-
creases the efficiency and economy of our entire transportation system.
Although new road construction has been constantly increasing,
the inadequacy of our highvmys to accommodate the combined movem.ent of
military units, commercial trucks, and a general exodus of the ciTilian
population is generally recognized. Military and aerial action is ex-
pected to cause severe congestion, and highvray problems are anticipated
by defense authorities as defense plans include the construction of mili-
tary roads, parallel highways, and super-highways
,
The air transport is rapidly increasing in importance as a
transportation factor, but its use in the carrying of commodities is
limited. We find that as long as a nation maintains superiority of the
air, it can operate transport planes with little or no interruption if it
is provided with reasonable protection. For limited use, transportation
Motor Facts
,
Automobile Lfeinufactiirers Association, 1940.
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by air is practical and effective, but it can never be considered as an
extensive substitute for the other types of transportation. The diffi-
culties which are encountered are that aircraft are important military
weapons, so their use for other purposes is suppressed and manufacturing
facilities are completely utilized for military construction. This pre-
vents the replacement of existing carrier planes, which quickly depre-
ciate, and checks the expansion of commercial aviation. Thus it can be
readily seen that this type of transportation is limited particularly to
emergencies, specific purposes, or for canning merchandise having a
high value and small bulk.
Factors Favoring Decentralization
Within the past twenty years a number of developments have
taken place which have made industrial decentralization a possibility.
The principal factor has been the development of electric povrer trans-
mission and the subsequent popularity of individual electric motors as
prime movers in industrial installations. The following chart shovT-s the
extent of the increased electric power used by industry in the past few
years
:
Electric Production and Production Capacity*
Product ion Capacity
(1000 Kilowatt Hovurs) (Kilowatt's)
1920 43,334,282 14,372,009
1925 65,751,137 23,512,000
1930 94,651,597 34,055,319
1935 98,464,073 36,074,442
1936 112,181,242 36,564,442
1937 121,836,813 37,134,382
1938 116,681,423 39,042,105
1939 130,336,050 40,317,924
Report of Federal Power Commission, 1939.

We find that during; this period the nation's ^eneratin?: capacity has in-
creased, while the cost per kilovratt hour has decreased. In fact, cen-
tral station operating efficiency has increased to the point where im-
proved service and lowered rates have caused many firms to use pxirchased
current rather than manufacture their ovm.
Installed Industrial Motors to Use Purchased Power *
Total No. Total H.P. Percentage to
Year Motors of Motors Total HorsepovYer
1899 182,562 1.8
1904 441,589 3.3
1909 199,309 1,749,031 9.4
1914 447,502 3,884,724 17.4
1919 976,463 9,284,499 31.7
1923 1,445,003 13,365,663 40.4
1925 1,724,180 15,868,828 44.3
1927 2,151,675 19,132,310 44.5
1929 2,724,843 22,775,664 44.5
The government policy of rural electrification and the con-
struction of electric power projects is constantly extending the system
of electrification, expanding the possibilities for the decentraliza-
tion of industry into more remote rural areas. The improvements in
generating and transmission equipment have resulted in bringing the
cost of even steam or Diesel generated power to new lov; figures, and
many firms install generating plants only for emergency use and pur-
chase their normal power needs from central stations. With these nev/er
developments we find that the power factor governing the location of
Public Utility Industries
,
Wilson, Herring and Eutsler; McGraw Hill
Book Co., 1936, New York, Pages 90 and 92, derived
from Electrical World Volxjme 106 #1 1936 pp. 57, 70.
Abstraofc of United States Census, 1930, pages 823-824,
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industry has become negligible, in a majority of oases, as a factor to
be considered in industrial migration.
The second natural development v;hich is favorable to industri-
al movement has been the development of motor vehicles and highways.
This factor is somevj-hat local in scope and encourages decentralization
within geographical areas rather than in the nation as a whole.
The motor truck has enabled the manufacturers of the nation
to locate economically at distances from the railroads or markets, par-
ticularly if their manufacture was not restricted to the heavy, bulky
commodities. The high costs of urban locations can be avoided through
a location in rural areas and the necessary transportation between
markets and rail terminals can be economically accomplished by using
motor trucks.
In addition to this, the passenger motor car has enabled the
manufacturer to tap a relatively wider labor market, and if he is
strategically located in a rural area he can usually sectire his labor
from a radius of fifty miles or more. It is not an \mcommon occvirrence
for people to travel to work daily in their avm cars from distances as
far away as eighty miles. In many cases, the motor car has caused the
population to move into the rural areas and go into the cities for work
or shopping, thus increasing localization of industry rather than dimini-
shing it, Hov/-ever, high taxes, rent, investment costs, and traffic con-
gestion have forced the establishment of subsidiary shopping and manu-
facturing areas. If this movement continues, decentralization within
areas will be encouraged to a considerable degree.
The speed and ease of communication might be listed as a
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decentralizing influence, but it can also be regarded as a localizing
factor. As its contribution in permitting industrial migration, ease of
communication has importance because one sometimes can transmit either
spoken or ivritten messages across the country much more easily than
within his ovm immediate locality. This factor allows constant contact
with markets miles av/ay and coupled with the transportation and pov^er
developments permits a greater amount of decentralization both within a
region or area and within the nation as ivas not heretofore possible.
The final natural decentralizing influence has been the recent
division of labor in industry. As manufacturing operations v^ere divided,
the need for skilled labor grew less, in many industries, and we find
that a quantity of unskilled labor was substituted in a majority of
operations. This has been important because it has eliminated the need
of locating close to a source where skilled labor was abimdant and re-
sulted in some decentralizing which was not possible under opposite
conditions
.
Since the present administration came into power in 1932,
its social policies show a pronounced effort to encourage the movement
of industry in the hope of establishing a more normal balance between
agriculture and industry and encouraging the rehabilitiation of rural
areas. This policy was designed primarily to benefit agriculture and
at the same time to equalize the rise and fall of business activity in
order to alleviate much of the suffering and expense of economic de-
pression. Perhaps its greatest experiment toward industrial decentra-
lization was the TVA Project where it was hoped the lure of cheap power
would attract industrial development. Similar developments have been
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attempted or are projected at Central Valley (Colorado), Boulder Dam,
Fort Peck, Grand Coulee, Bonneville, Passamaquoddy, Casper Alcova, Blue
Stone Reservation (I'fest Virginia); and with the proposed construction of
the St, Lawrence Waterway a power plant is slated for the northeast area.
In addition to the lure of cheap pov^er, social legislation
and government labor policies tend to eliminate the labor advantages which
might be derived from specific localities because wage scales tend to be
uniform either by minimum -vrnge laws or union activity, and the 40-hour
week throughout the nation will undoubtedly result in plant expansion,
particularly during a period of business rec'bvery. With plant expansion
and the elimination of much of the advantages and barriers in industrial
location, plants will endeavor to locate where industry can produce and
market its products more economically; therefore, it is not surprising
to see branch plants being established in other sections of the nation.
As a part of the national defense plans, government contracts
are let on as wide a geographical area as possible for two reasons.
Principally, the idea is designed as a precautionary defense measure to
encourage decentralization by distributing the contracts over a wide area
and secondly, a political and economic reason - that the entire nation
may receive the benefit of the money and business which is created by
this gigantic expenditure.
As an additional means of actually decentralizing defense
industries, new plants will be sponsored by the government, and if not
built by private firms they will be built and leased by the defense
authorities. In both of these cases the location will not be deter-
mined by industry but according to governmental desires and military
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strategy. This relocation will, it is expected, result in additional
industrial expansion in the areas of the new plants in order to supply
the new markets which new industries v/ill create.
As an integral part of the decentralization scheme, trial,
or educational orders have been issued over a diverse number of in-
dustries and areas to permit plants to "tool up" for war industries. A
combination of British and domestic demands for armaments encourages
manufacturers to expand their productive capacity. Many, hovrever, hesi-
tate in making new investments because limited profits and the risk that
the armament program may suddenly stop makes the future uncertain. In
view of these conditions steps have been necessary to encourage the .
essential plant expansion and to increase the nation's productive capa-
city to meet needs of the defense emergency.
The government construction of plants and the subsequent
leasing to private manufacturers or government operation is a very ac-
tive step toward decentralization. Here industry has nothing to lose
as a result of a sudden cessation of armament activities.
Private plants constructed with private funds can amortize the
cost of plant construction during the short period of five years and
may deduct this amount from their income or excess profits taxes. This
policy permits the investors to recover the cost of the plant dxAring
the defense program, and since there are indications that armament pro-
duction will probably extend over five years, there is little danger
to fear from loss.
For those plants desiring to expand, it is proposed to extend
Reconstruction Finance Corporation help to them for expansion purposes.

This assistance will he an exoeption rather than the rule, because where
-
ever possible the government desires that the program be privately fi-
nanced. There is a timidness on the part of private investors to place
money in plant expansion at this tiipe because profits on government con-
tracts will he limited to 10% by the excess profits tax. Skilled labor
is scarce, and the time-and-one -ha If provisions of the Y^age and Hour Law
will further limit profits if labor is allowed to work overtime. It
seems that the prospects of limited profit, the possibility that the
plants might not be amortized in five years, and the supplementing of
control by management by government and union dictation will force the
adoption of Reconstruction Finance Corporation loans or other than pri-
vate financing in a great many plant construction projects.
Barriers to Decentra 1 i zat ion
Even though we have evidence that the government is taking
positive steps in an effort to bring pressure upon industry to decentra-
lize, there are many deterrent factors which will necessarily hinder the
program to a considerable extent. The expense of moving for any industry,
whether it decides on a complete migration of its entire plant or merely
the establishment of branch plants, is impracticable from a number of
angles. First we find that to construct a new plant involves a consider-
able outlay of funds vrhich cannot always be justified by the economies
which will be effected or the greater volume of profits or sales which
can be secured. One might argue that the firm might lease the necessary
space, but most large industries which decide to transfer activities
elsewhere find it difficult, particularly in undeveloped regions, to
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readily obtain a suitable plant and usually if one is found alterations
must be made to adapt it to the particular products manufactured. We
also find that the peculiarity of certain industries prevents the effi-
cient operation of small plant§ and the construction of a duplicate
plant or facilities would result in both plants operating at a loss,
A further deterring factor to. business mip;ration is the com-
parative immobility of a skilled labor supply. Men dislike to leave
old friends and relatives, sell their property, and then go to the ex-
pense of repurchasing, or moving their household furniture and transport-
ing their fam: ly to some distant city, ?.Tiere skilled labor is an es-
sential part of an industry this factor sometimes assumes the character
of the greatest deterrent to a transfer of industrial operations.
Sometimes the lure of higher imfres or unemployment can be
counted upon as sufficient inducements to take skilled labor away from
its usual habitations, but as a general rule the majority of skilled
labor is able to secure employment nearer home and prefers this rather
than migrating several hundred miles away.
The so-called "Settlement Laws" are another restriction to a
migration of the labor supply. These require a residence of up to five
years, in many states, before an individual can apply for relief from
the established governmental agencies, A standardization of all state
laws or the Federal regulation of relief to migratory workers v/ould be
helpful in providing an added impetus to the m.ovement of labor. If an
adjustment vrere made of the unemployment compensation lavfs, or compulsory
dismissal wages were required, it might be possible to transfer the
workers back to the state of last residence. To provide for this transit
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would restore the worker* s ability to secure relief, but it would not
provide effective decentralization, for it would tend to place burdens
upon many communities that have lost a remunerative industry by migra-
tion and therefore their revenues do not justify an excessive relief
burden..
A much more mobile labor supply is now being created by many
firms by instructing apprentices on the floor of the plant to take care
of expansion needs. With the establishment of new plants, younger men
will be anxious and enthusiastic about new opportunities being offered,
and having few or no dependents and a desire to establish themselves in
a life position, their transfer to new locations can be effected much
more readily than older men who have lost the eagerness and vigor of
youth and have settled in a locality.
Much decentralization, if it is to be a true decentralization,
will result in higher production costs and transportation expenditures.
In the east we find that railroads have provided every convenience for
shippers, and ever^-- fair-sized plant has its own. railroad siding for
the delivery of raw materials and the dispatch of finished products.
Its markets are v/ithin a comparatively sm.all radius and the density of
population makes advertising and distribution both economical and ef-
fective. As a general rule the labor supply is over abundant and the
productive facilities can be utilized to a maximum degree.
In many of our central western states where the migration of
industry would be desirable, we find that opposite conditions usually
prevail and there are few firms that can move into a rural community
and operate as effectively as in the more congested areas. Although

the railroads have a large amount of trackage in the sparsely settled
sections of the country', it is doubtful v/hether the service can alv/ays
be readily furnished direct to the plant site, and a considerable
amount of trucking may be necessary both for raw materials and finished
products. In addition, it is doubtful whether train service in many
sparsely settled communities is as frequent and rapid as in more con-
gested areas. Naturally, in time it can be predicted that a satis-
factory and efficient transportation system can be developed in any
community, but industry/ cannot stand, in the face of competition, the
inconveniences and expense of awaiting the industrial development of
its new area of location.
A further barrier to industrial migration is the inadequacy
of housing facilities. The shortage of housing is acute in areas
which are feeling the effects of industrial expansion and sim.ilar con-
ditions can be expected to occur at any point where industry should
choose to migrate. Scarcities of housing are being felt primarily at
Rockdale, Illinois; Portsmouth, New Hampshire; and Hartford, Connec-
ticut; and rentals are soaring skyward in the vicinity of goverranent
navy yards, army posts, and at other centers vfhere industrial con-
struction or expansion has been \indertaken. V/orkers are foimd to live
under inadequate conditions, and the living expenses are taking a magor
portion of their earnings. Unless a worker is totally unemployed and
lacks any means of subsistence it vrould be difficult to persuade him
to move where such unattractive conditions prevail.
The construction of Federal Power Projects through hydro-
electric installations as a part of the rural electrification program
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has served as an inducement to force industry to migrate. Here vre find
that the incentive has "back-fired!' and that in an emerg;ency there are
signs that all is now well with government power. In pointing out a
specific instance, we must turn our attention to the TVA plant. The
Alcoa aluminxxtn plant derives its electric current for the manufacture
of alxaninum solely from TVA, With its inception of operations TVA pur-
chased the plants of independent utilities in its area of operations,
dismantled their plants, and became the sole producer of electric power,
Y/ith added defense demands for aluminvtm, we find that TVA is unable to
produce sufficient generating capacity for Alcoa's plant and its other
customers. Thus we find the Tennessee Valley Authority tirying to make
arrangements for supplementing its productive capacity with a steam
generating plant. It is now recognized, though not generally admitted,
that cheap povrer v/as produced as a result of government subsidy, that
operating costs of private companies were relatively lower, and that if
private enterprize in the power field had been allowed to exist there
would have been sufficient generating capacity for all potential needs.
Public utility capacity is said to '^e more flexible in regard to ex-
pansion when conditions justify it, but since either government owner-
shipship or private utilities can be "bottle necke" in a crisis, a com-
bination of both will perhaps be the most effective solution to our
power problem..
If these conditions can be regarded as a criterion, it can be
expected that the increasing use of aluminum, electric furnaces in the
steel industry, and power requirements in general will make industry
hesitate before it moves to an area whose potential electrical

requirements may rapidly exhaust the only source of supply.
In an effort to prevent industrial migration there is a
constant competitive spirit among various states to attract new in-
dustries or hold old ones. It seems that the tendency of state pub-
licity bureaus, however, is to concentrate most of their efforts in
an attempt to attract nev/ industries, paying very little attention to
the retaining of old ones. This does much to counteract the migration
of industry and it does not encourare decentralization because the
richest states or communities with greater manufacturing activity can
afford to offer greater inducements and to spend more in advertising
their merits to the world at large.
In contrast to this activity small communities possessing
inexpensive land or a low tax rate offer tax-free property for in-
dustrial developm^ent or donate the land for construction, but the
axiom "business thrives best where business is moBt" seems to be the
rule follov/ed; and when tv/o contending forces contest for industrial
supremacy, the largest usually has the greatest influence and industry
tends to remain concentrated.
Extent of Natural Decentralization
There has been a degree of natural decentralization, but much
of it has been a transfer from one congested area to another,. In a
statistical analysis of any shift in industry of this nature, it is
difficult to secure a true statistical figure to reflect the shift of
industry because of the changes in business activity which occur in
different sections at a particular time and the general rise or fall
of business activity during periods of prosperity and depression.

Furthermore, if one examines specific industries one may find
that the migration of a single industry in one state may give a small
percentage of change Tvben compared to national production but may give
a very high ration of change if compared to the total production within
the state.
One of the most comprehensive stiidies on industrial migration
is the Iowa Studies in Bus ine ss No« VII*, published in March 1930. In
this study the year 1914 was taken as the ind^x-year (with 100 as the
base), and changes in business location were analyzed to the year 1927
in an effort to secure a representative year \maffected by excessive
depression or prosperity. As a result of the computations made in the
study, the following changes were stated to have taken place in regard
to industrial activity.
Concentration of Maniifacturing in Various Geographical Areas
1914 1927 Net Change 1914^
New England 12.85 10.80 - 2.05
Middle Atlantic 34,14 32,77 - 1.37
East North Central 27.83 30.69 2.86
West North Central 6.41 5,67 - .75
South Atlantic 6.88 7.77 ,89
East South Central 3.17 2.84 - .33
West South Central 2.79 2.74 - .05
Mountain 1.67 1,17 - .50
Pacific 4.25 5.55 1.30
It was concluded that though a superficial examination of
statistics indicated industrial movement, there vms little actual de-
centralization between geographical areas but merely a migratory
movement westward and southvrard from, one geographical area which led
Industfial^Migrat ion in the United States
,
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published by College of Commerce, State University of Iowa,
Iowa City, Iowa.
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in industrial activity to another.
As a result of their studies they concluded that there was
the following:
A Deoline in the Importance^ Of
New England States - particu-
larly Massachusetts-1,25^
Middle Atlantic States - parti-
cularly Pennsylvania-, 75/^,
and Nev/ York-.eZfo
Entire Yfest North Central Group-
except South Dakota which had
no change
Entire Mountain Group - except
Vfyoming-.02/?i gain, Idaho un-
changed
Entire South, except North Caro-
lina-, 94?^ gainj Texas-, 23^!^;
Alabama-. 13^j Virginia-, 08^5
South Carolina-,07^; Oklahoma-
»06%i Tennessee-, 05?^j and Dis-
trict of Columbia-, 03/0, small
gains
,
Two states which also showed a
great decline were Kentucky-
,45/5, and Minnesota-. 35^.
The following is the rate of increase or decrease within the geographi-
cal area:
Decrease Increase
An Increase in the Importance Of
East North Central States - ex-
cept Illinois which had ,25%
loss
Pacific Coast States - except
Washington which had ,05% loss.
Largest increases were attributed
to
:
Michigan
California
North Carolina
Ohio
Indiana
1.!
1.27^
.94^
,81%
,25%
Mountain States - 29. 9?^
New England - 16,0%
West North Central States -11,7%
East South Central States - 10.4^
Middle Atlantic States - 4.0^
Yrest South Central States - 1,8^
Pacific States - 30.6^
South Atlantic States - 12.9^
East North Central States - 7,6%
This analysis indicates that the trends of industrial concentration of
our geographical areas have made no substantial changes in bringing about
an equalization of industrial activity as the proponents of decentrali-
zation vision but has merely transferred it from one section and placed
it in another.
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In regard to decentralization vrithin the reographical areas
vre find that there has heen a general population trend away from the
rural areas toward the urban centers.
Urban and Rural Population by Geographic Divisions
1920 Urban 1930 Urban
Percentage Percentage
United States 61.4 56.2
New England 79.2 77.3
Middle Atlantic 74.9 77.4
East North Central 60.8 66.4
West North Central 37.7 41.8
South Atlantic 31.0 36.1
East South Central 22,4 28.1
West South Central 29.0 36.4
Mountain 36,4 39.4
Pacific 62,4 67.5
Throughout the entire nation there has been a general movement in the
direction of the city, and in the one case where there has been a
definite trend in the opposite direction - namely. New England - it
can be explained that this is due to a change in the basis of enumera-
tion made by the Bureau of the Census, (This is due to the fact that
10,000 or over was considered urban in 1920, while 2500 and upvrards
was considered urban in 1930. This accounts for the decrease. If an
adjustment is m.ade it will be found that New England experienced prac-
tically no change.)
By dividing the population distribution according to size
of city or town, we find some changes vrhich denote the opposite trend
within certain population groups, and 1940 census figures are expected
to show an increased trend toward smaller communities.
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Popiilation Distrihution in the United States
By Size of Community
(by percentage)
1930 1920 1910 1900
Urban Territory DO • C AC Q 40.0
Places of 1 million or more 12 .3 9.6 q 9 O . JJ
II 11 500,000 to 1 million 4.7 5.9 3.3 2.2
II II 250,000 to 500,000 6,5 4.3 4.3 3.8
n II 100,000 to 250,000 6.1 6.2 5.3 4.3
ti II 50,000 to 100,000 5.3 5.0 4.5 3.6
n II 25,000 to 50,000 5.2 4.8 4.4 3.7
11 II 10,000 to 25,000 7.4 6.6 6.0 5.7
II II 5,000 to 10,000 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.2
II It 2,500 to 5,000 3.8 4.3 4.2 4.1
Riiral Territory 43.8 48.6 54.2 60.0
Incorporated places 1,000 to 2,500 3.9) 8.5 8.9 8.3
II
" under 1,000 3.6)
Other Territory 36.4 40.1 45.3 51.7
Significant changes may he found in the 500,000 to 1,000,000
population cities and 10,000 to 250,000 groups, as -vrell as those posses-
sing 5,000 to 10,000 inhabitants.
Losses in Nvmiber of Wage Earners
In Certain Population Groups *
No. of y/'orkers
25 largest cities of U.S. 326,800
100,000 - 250,000 population
25,000 - 100,000 "
10,000 - 25,000 "
Gains in Number of Wage Earners
10,000 or less population 55,204
Statistics of this nature lead one to suspect that the
smaller tovms are gaining in employment, but it is doubtful whether
this is true. Census of manufactures figures shov? a decline of the
Recent Economic Changes
,
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percentage of wage earners in urban areas from 53.3^ in 1929 to 51,8?^
in 1933 (a difference of 1,5?^), but it is difficult to regard this as
a gain for rural areas inasmuch as it is impossible to determine whether
this figure accurately represents a cain in the number of workers or
merely a relatively smaller amount of unemployment for rural areas.
In any case, the figures do not represent a substantial change which
can be called an important trend toward decentralization.
In Recent Economic Changes there is an analysis of two hundred
and twenty-eight firms which changed location in the year 1927, (Sta-
tistics furnished by U, S. Chamber of Commerce), In this analysis the
most accurate indication of decentralization can be secured by noting
that thirty plants stayed in the same population group, seventy-two
went to a larger community, and one hundred twenty-six went to smaller
communities. The greatest net loss in the number of plants was rea-
lized by cities of over 500,000 and the greatest gains were made by
communities of 200,000 or less inhabitants. If v/e compare this with
1930 census population data (previously mentioned) we find that these
changes are somewhat comparable to the population changes except in
the case of the rural territory figures.
The comparison of Recent Economic Changes with Iovtsl Studies
in Busines s leads to the conclusion that there has been an insignifi-
cant amount of decentralization and that which has occurred has been
principally restricted to small business. In Recent Economic Changes
the study was based entirely in wage earners and size of community,
while the Iowa Studies in Business took into consideration other fac-
tors; namely, the value of product mantifactured. The number of wage
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earners cannot be taken as an indicator of trends, because large cities
contain the larger establishments which adopt technological changes as
soon as they are developed, Riiral factories, being smaller, cannot af-
ford the latest machinery and must rely on less efficient methods and
more vrorkers to accomplish, relatively, the same results. The value
of production in urban areas may remain constant or may increase dur-
ing a period when workers are displaced.
There is reason to believe that the recent depression encour-
aged the establishment of smaller industrial units. The increased ten-
dency to offset transportation costs through the establishment of branch
plants is generally recognized, but the development of the rural com-
munity has remained practically iwiaffected by this change, as the ten-
dency in general is to^-ard urban locations in other geographical areas.
In simmarizing our discussion of decentralization we must
recognize the fact that though it has been regarded by many as a trend
in this country, a large part of so-called decentralization has been
migration. There are tendencies of local decentralization within geo-
graphical areas, but these cannot produce the national safety and social
and economic benefits to which the proponents of this theory subscribe.
We must note that regardless of the fact that government policy, com-
munication, povrer facilities, and transportation have prepared the way,
the relocation of industry on a decentralized basis still seems im-
practical with regard to movem.ent into an undeveloped community and
the trend is not as pronounced as we are som.etimes led to believe.
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Reoent Decentralization Trends
As the center of population moves westward it can be ex-
pected that industry will follow the movement. To expect decentra-
lization of industry first and a movement of population later is un-
natural and difficult to imagine. The lure of greater profits or
employment, however, has a decided affect on unemployed workers, and
their willingness to change their location is evidenced by their migra-
tion toward new industrial centers of the nation.
The viniformity of wages and working conditions, developments
in scientific lighting and air conditioning, inexpensive electric
power, and the movement of population and markets will have both nega-
tive and positive results in industrial location. There v/ill be more
reason to locate in the section which offers the greatest economic
advantages, and it is difficult to predict just how far decentraliza-
tion can be expected to extend in the face of these newer developments.
The gradual movement of industry into rural areas and av,ray from \arban
locations can be predicted as a definite movement which will increase
with the passage of time.
Encouraged by the defense efforts of both government and
business, we will, within the next few months, see true examples of
decentralization. Industries -viill be placed in inland areas in loca-
tions hundreds of miles apart, in districts where similar plants do not
exist. If these nevr plants succeed in substantially increasing the
population in their vicinity, then the gradual movement of other in-
dustries will follow the establishment of new markets.
There are a nvonber of influences in operation which are

causing decentralization of industry in the United States, Due to
increased competition and the decreased profits which have heen a com-
moon occurrence since 1929 economic efficiency has demanded that all
possible means be employed to bring; about profitable operation in the
face of rising unit costs and lovrer sales volume. Previous to the re-
cent business depression, the United States prided itself in size and
constructed enormous factories and buildings v/hich were supposed to re-
sult in increased profits. With the decline of sales and profits, the
larger units found that the operation at partial capacity resulted in
higher unit costs than small plants and a complete reversal of policy
was instigated and the economic advantage of smaller manufacturing
units was recognized.
With the elimination of some of the barriers which prevented
the decentralization of industry the trends toward relocation have be-
come more pronounced fend such locations are almost universally chosen
because of the economic necessity of lovj^ering production and distri-
buting costs for the piu-pose of meeting competition.
This new trend falls into two general classifications. The
first may be regarded as the natural movement of industry for the
economies which may be realized, and the second is a more or less ar-
tificial movement which is sponsored by the government in the interests
of national defense and the welfare of the nation as a whole. The two
combined movements are rapidly increasing the rate of movement of in-
dustries and will naturally result in substantial changes in the na-
tion's industrial and economic structure.
If v;-e reflect upon the reasons which influenced the location
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of industry one realizes that the barriers to free movement are for
practical purposes rapidly becoming of minor importance. Due to the
fact that the nation's territorial expansion has ceased, the stage
is set for industrial decentralization. It is not to be considered as
a revolution but in terms of an evolution which may take place over a
considerable period of tim.e.
The dangers in the decentralization of industry are that it
tends to move from one highly congested area to another or it tends
to decentralize within the immediate area in which it is located.
While this movement m.ay be desirable from an economic viewpoint, it
does not seriously change the unbalanced industrial condition of the
nation but merely tends to transfer it from one section to another.
This may bring the desired economies from the vievrpoint of management,
but it does not provide a greater amount of national security nor does
it affect the social v;-ell-being of the nation as a whole.
There are evidences that industry has been forced by high
investments in real estate and high taxes to move into the suburban
areas, but this has not substantially alleviated the condition. It
has merely increased the area of congestion, and in most cases m.igra-
tion has been from city to city rather than from city to country.
The most important step in industrial decentralization in
recent years has been that taken by the Ford Motor Company. Here we
find that one of our leading industrialists has undertaken to place
into practice decentralization theories and found them to be practical
when integrated into his industrial empire.
The Ford organization, perhaps, is an example of the largest
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industrial organization to develop decentralization as a fixed policy.
As a result of the establishment of manufactxiring, assembly, and ser-
vice plants, it may be said that the policy is carried out locally,
nationally, and internationally,
V/hat principally concerns us in this discussion is the ob-
vious success which Ford has had in transferring some of his manu-
facturing operations to small rural Michigan towns. The twenty-four
decentralized plants which have been established vary in size from a
plant at ?/aterford, Michigan, employing sixty-five men to a plant at
Ypsilanti, Michigan, employing 1200 men.
There are no humanitarian or philanthropic motives in the
establishment of these small plants in rural communities, Wages are
paid on the same basis as the large plants; and though transportation
costs are said to be higher, it has been found that pride, craftsman-
ship, and psychology of working in a small plant lower supervision costs
and result in higher standards of workmanship,
A unique feature of these Ford plants is that during the
planting and harvest seasons time is piven from work to perm.it the
employees to operate their farms. In periods of prolonged idleness
the city dweller is an economic burden to the nation, while these
farmer-workers have sufficient postponed work to keep them busy during
periods of prolonged idleness. In any event, the small income which
their farm.s produce keeps them in the vicinity and they are available
when the plant reopens.
Ford studies have shovrn that the farmer-worker is of higher
intelligence than the average worker. He thinks more for himself, and

any ideas which he may have do not become dwarfed by the size of the
establishment. The worker's job means a great deal because there are
not many jobs available in the vicinity,
A certain amo\mt of decentralization is accomplished vrith
the increasing practice among large fims to let out contracts for
parts and accessories which are used in the assembly of the finished
product. For example, thousands of automotive parts are made in New
England consisting of nuts, screws, bolts, electrical equipment, in-
struments and precision tools for use in the large factories in
Michigan, An automobile may be assembled from parts some of which were
manufactured several hundred miles away. This is an example of decen-
tralization, but the points of assembly for these parts are primarily
located in Michigan, making the automotive industrjr localized, and
there is an increased tendency among these small industries to move
toward the automotive centers. As a further example of decentraliza-
tion vre can use the manufactiire of the Boeing Bomber,* Thirty-three
states furnish raw materials and tv:o hundred thirteen major sub-
contractors furnish parts from a total of five hundred thirty-six
subcontractors located in almost every state in the country.
Many large manufacturers, recognizing the economies to be
effected through the use of subcontracts have been unconsciously
creating a decentralization of their ovm industry'', and the major plant
has become principally a point of assembly. The decentralization tends
to be minimized as small manufactures gradually converge closer to the
Factory
,
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area of assembly, and localization invariably results.
One of the principal drawbacks to subcontracting or "farming-
out" has been the lack of faith vrhich prime contractors have had in
products manufactured outside of their o\m plants. Com.plicated ma-
chineiry which is accepted by army or navy engineers must ivithstand
rigorous tests and meet exacting specifications which reflect upon a
manufacturer's ability and his eligibility for future contracts.
Manufactvirers dislike to risk their reputations on parts manufactured
by small concerns, and army or navy engineering boards cannot undertake
testing small parts and accepting responsibility as to their perfection.
Profiting by Britain's experience in "farming-out" sm.all
parts, increased attention is being placed upon the practice. It is
felt that though high testing and inspection costs might be neces-
sary, resulting in higher m.anufacturing costs, the net cost will be
lower, for it v/ill bring about the increased utilization of available
equipment and a less extensive investment in new facilities vrhich
would result in over-expanded industrial facilities when the defense
program, ends.
The concentration of orders among a small nvimber of companies
has given added im.petus to the movement of "farming-out" contracts
among smaller manufacturers yrho can pool their facilities for subcontract
vrork. The fact that only 511 companies have contracts in excess of
$100,000.00 in the last six months of 1940 and the fact that 114 firms
held 95% of the defense orders during that period is a practical indi-
cator of the concentration of orders and the untapped facilities which
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can only be utilized 'hy a more extensive use of suhcontractingi*'
As a part of its survey/- of existing facilities, the Defense
Board found that three Virginia counties possessed 365 machine tools
which were not in use 90% of the time, and they estimated that 50% of
the nation's machine tools were not in use. This startling investiga-
tion has started a drive to place all existing facilities at full
operation and to place all nevr developments on a secondary basis.
Simplification and standardization of all kinds of parts is an ef-
fective step toward bringing more and more machine tools into opera-
tion, A majority of these idle machines are in rviral locailities,
and since the trend in all armaments is simplicity, the antiquity of the
tools becomes a negligible factor as they are able to satisfactorily per-
form simple operations with a less specialized type of labor, A com-
plete utilization of all facilities results in the release of much
skilled labor and modern equipment for the more complicated operations
requiring highly developed tools and skilled craftsmanship.
An example of the extent of the decentralization which can be
accomplished by a large plant was recently brought to the attention of
the ivriter by a person taking advantage of a policy undertaken by the
Lynn plant of the General Electric Company, This large company, per-
haps more for reasons of economy and efficiency, has brought decentra-
lization to the greatest extreme. In addition to subletting contracts
to small machine shops throughout the area surrounding its plants, it
invites individuals possessing metal-working machines to participate
Editorial Research Reports
,
Febrmry 20, 1940, Volume I, p, 131,
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in the defense program. Upon application, in which the individual
explains his capacity and the equipment available, this plant provides
a small quantity of stock or semi-finished material and has it machined
to specifications. When the ability of the applicant to meet the re-
quirements is demonstrated, small lots of merchandise are issued for
processing on a piecework basis at irregular internals.
This extension of industry to the home workshop may be said
to be complete decentralization. Obviously, this procedure has its
limits and is impracticable for many industries, but it has possibi-
lities which a nation at war might find it advisable to adopt , at least
in part, when it finds it advantageous to decentralize industry without
making unnecessary investments in plant and equipment and migrating
large quantities of labor to new areas.
Government Decentra lization Plans_
The unpreparedness of both government and industry for the
large scale rearmament program makes it necessary to practically estab-
lish a nev; industry for the manufacture of armaments. Technological
changes which have occurred in modern iwrfare and industry have made
the facilities which vrere available in the last war woefully inadequate
to meet the requirements of the present or any future emergency, A
preliminary estimate of the immediate requirements of new plants neces-
sary to achieve the required armament production has been placed at
sixty establishments,* Since this expansion will ultimately involve
the expenditure of millions of dollars and have a direct bearing on
Factory Magazine
, September 1940, p, 42
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military efficiency and preparedness, it is not surprising to find
that the locations chosen for new plant construction have been the re-
sult of intensive studies by both military and industrial leaders in
the light of recent developments abroad. Besides providing the maximiam
security for these essential undertakings, the government has set an
example for business to follow, particularly in regard to essential
industries
•
The government desires private enterprise to finance its ovm
expansion as much as circumstances will permit, and as a result of this
policy it has neither the authority nor the ability to dictate to pri-
vate enterprise the plant locations financed with private funds. V/here
construction is carried on by government funds, the authority of the
government in selecting sites for plant location is incontestable.
Recognizing the fact that the mass migration of essential in-
dustries is a virtual impossibility due to the time which would be con-
sxOTied in moving industries and that the economic chaos which v,rould in-
evitably result from such a movement would bring about severe reper-
cussions, contracts have been av;arded over as wide a geographical area
as possible. The objective of the defense program is to utilize present
industrial capacity to the maximm in an effort to rearm to the point
where national safety can be insured with a minimum of delay. The
policy of spreading contracts geographically is an attempt to partially
offset the dangers of industrial concentration of the nation in case
the nation were attacked and to relieve the congestion which inevitably
results under concentrated conditions. Recent statistics are the most
accurate indicators of industrial and govermnent policies as they apply
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to both the immediate and future phases of the rearmament program.
An analysis of primary contracts avmrded discloses that
Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Missouri, and Okla-
homa received contracts amounting to onlyt:i5.59 per capita while the
national average vra.s $73.37 per capita*. This denotes that the estab-
lished manufacturing facilities located in other states are being re-
lied upon to provide the production for the initial phases of the de-
fense program.
In contrast to this policy we find that the Middle '^'est has
received over one half of the funds allotted for plant expansion and
construction. This denotes the new policy of decentralization for de-
fense and provides an indication of the area of future defense produc-
tion.
The following table illustrates more specifically present
government policies and probable future plans in regard to armament
production throughout the country.
Percentages of National Production, Defense Contracts
and Defense Construction According to Geographical Areas
Value Added Value Defense Contracts for
By Manufacture Contracts Plant Construct ion
New England 9.8 14,8 5.0
Middle Atlantic 29.8 31.3 9,2
South Atlantic 9.1 13.7 12.6
North Central 37.0 18.4 56,5
South Central 6.9 3.8 8.6
Mountain & Pacific 7.6 16.6 8,1
Outside Continental
United States None 1,4 None
(Above figures are based on primary contracts avrarded. They do not
include subcontractors and are sometimes based on the location of the
bidder's main office.)
Editorial Research Reports, February 20, 1941, Volume 1, No.
7
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Studies made by the War Department disclose that the greatest
plant shortage exists in those plants capable of quantity production of
those items which are useless for civilian needs. It is a comparatively
easy matter to divert automotive manufactures to the production of
armored cars or transport vehicles, but the production of aircraft, en-
gines, mchine guns, powder, cannon and ammunition require specialized
plants, as they do not meet any civilian needs and the amount of exist-
ing facilities capable of being diverted to such production are neces-
sarily limited.
The National Defense Board provides recommendations for pri-
vate plant construction with private funds. Though the manufacturer
is not denied the right to choose his ovm plant site, his cooperative
spirit usually causes him to follov; the government's recommendations
whenever feasible. In cases where e-overnment funds are used for plant
construction, the suggestions offered by defense authorities will be
more or less obligatory, and naturally, wherever the government under-
takes construction for itself or for leasing piu-poses it vrill be the
sole judge as to choice of location.
Locations of Defense Contracts and Plants
In the selection of sites for its own plants, the government
has set up five major areas v/hich are located from, two hundred twenty
to two hundred fifty mile.s from, the boundaries of the United States,
Roughly, this area is east of the Rocky Mountains, two hundred fifty
miles south of the Canadian Border, two hundred fifty miles inland from
the Atlantic coast line, and tvro hundred fifty miles north of the
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Mexican Border. The strip surrounding the area represents the minimum
distance which is necessary to provide for the effective operation of
the various devices for protection against air attack. The terrain
within this area is said to be much more readily defended by land
forces in case of invasion, and the mountains prevalent in the area are
natural barriers to the efficient operation of invading land forces and
limit the visibility of air attackers to a considerable degree.
This broad inland area has been alphabetically divided as
follov/s
:
Area A - to include northern Indiana, Illinois, southern Wisconsin,
Minnesota, Iowa and westward;
Area B - to include Ohio, south western Pennsylvania, West Virginia,
western portion of Virginia, and eastern Kentucky;
Area C - to include southern Indiana and Illinois, western Kentucky,
Missouri, eastern Kansas, then v/estvrardj
Area D - to include western North Carolina, northern Georgia and Alabama,
and the eastern part of Tennessee, then westward;
Area E - to include the western part of Tennessee, northern Louisiana
and Texas, Oklahoma and westward.
The complete defense plan includes the construction of plants,
in this area, for the manufacture of explosives, povirder, ammunition
loading, fuse loading, small arm.s, and ms.chine guns. Some aircraft
plants are located within this area, and assembly plants now under
construction will bring a substantial part of the proposed production
v/ithin the area. The ideal situation, which is the military strate-
gists' dream, would provide for economic and military independence for
each of the five divisions within the inland area. The objective of
this desire is mainly that if one area should be sevec^ly damaged or
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controlled by an enemy force, the defending; armies could fall hack tovreird
the next area and he assured of a continued industrial production which
would permit a resumption of offensive operations against the enemy
forces.
The crucial period of rearmament is the initial period, because
our concentrated industrial centers must produce in sufficient quanti-
ties to provide the necessary equipment to vxage a military campaign.
After the period of initial rearmament a drop in the productive capa-
city due to enemy activity would not be quite so serious provided the
inland areas 'mre adequately defended and they were able to continue
the production of aircraft, explosives and other commodities which re-
quire the most frequent replenishment during military action.
This distribution of essential plants assures the continued
production of essential materials even though one or two plants may be
severely damaged or destroyed. The plan eliminates the hazardous con-
dition ^vhich is so prevalent in our coastal areas, and the distribution
of both plants and population in such sparsely settled and protected
communities would be a positive incentive toward encouraging eastern
decentralization of both industry and population in a period of war.
From ViThat little infonnation is available in regard to these
new defense plants, one secures the impression that they will be of
the latest design and construction in industrial plant structure and
a model for industry to follow. Features which will be found among
these nev^ buildings include camouflaged roofs to represent golf courses
or other natural effects. The construction of separate units (parti-
cularly in the case of explosives factories) assures continued operation
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of sections of the plant in case military operations, sabotage or ac-
cidents result in damage or destruction to certain parts of the estab-
lishment .
Cool fluorescent lighting will be favored over less modern
types, and the lack of windows may be one of the most startling changes
in construction to be effected. Protection against bomb attack is in-
creased through concrete steel-reinforced foundations, corrugated iron
vfalls, layers of sand under the floors of one-story structiires, and
concrete bomb shields at the entrances, which are provided with steel
doors. The absence of windows probably denotes the possibility that
air-conditioning will be included as a part of the construction, and
the general specifications will probably approach those of a huge air-
raid shelter to permit continued factory operation during aerial bom-
bardment, thus insuring maximum production with a reasonable amount of
safety for the workers in the plant.
In the actual selection of plant sites within this huge area
between the Alleghany and Rocky Mountains, the Vfar Depajrtment Planning
Board has issued a number of essential requirements to be follovred in
the general construction program. First, the earliest attention possible
must be devoted to the construction of facilities for the manufacture
of explosives and shells. The plants must be strategically located to
enable the military forces to defend the location as easily as possible.
The geographic distribution within the area must be such as
to prevent concentration, and this must be particularly follovred in
regard to munitions plants v/hich besides being dangerous to themselves
are equally dangerous to the industries or population located in their
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vioinity.
The area or site reserved for plant construction should be
free of gas, oil or water lines, mineral deposits and assigned mineral
rights
•
There must be ample rail transportation with at least two
independent rail lines and well-constructed roads and highv;ays capable
of sustaining the traffic of the heavier trucks and military equipment.
Skilled and semi-skilled labor must be available within a fair
radius of territory.
There must be sufficient electric pov/er for potential as well
as present needs.
Pure water must be available in unlimited quantities, parti-
cularly if it is needed in manufacturing operations; and vmter facili-
ties for the disposal of spent acids which result in some kinds of
manufacturing must also be available.
There must be a proximity of the necessary rav: materials,
which consist primarily of the following:
for the manufacture of smokeless powder -
cotton linters or wood pulp, nitric acid, alcohol, ether,
other solvents and coalj
for shell loading -
toluol, diphenylamine, phenol or other hydrocarbons, nitric
acid, sulphinic acid and fuel.
This policy in the choosing of plant sites will not be
strictly adhered to because within the defense program there are op-
poi-tunities for increasing some of the aims and objectives of the
New Deal. The nevr government plants will be a means of rehabilitation
of many rural areas and may be the opening v/edge in an attempt to
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further increase the social benefits which the p;overnment has sponsored
without resulting in additional expenditures of money for farm relief.
Here we find that there is an opportunity to provide industrial em-
ployment for many of the low income farm families and thus supplement
or supplant the income of marginal farm lands by industrial activity.
Political pressure and favoritism can be expected to influ-
ence the selection of plant sites, because it is a part of the demo-
cratic system of government and it is natural in any program to retain
or secure additional good will for future elections.
In general, the scheme can be commended as meeting the re-
quirements of military strategy and economic desirability. The con-
struction is planned according to military efficiency because when an
expenditure is made it must not only conform to present conditions but
to future possibilities, and it must be recognized that decentralized
defense plants can easily be the nation's salvation. The locations
chosen will be economically desirable because they tap a large labor
reserve which was heretofore unavailable, unnecessary transportation
will be avoided, and the concentration of industry which prevails in
congested areas v^rill be eliminated.
The defense program in these areas will serve a dual purpose.
It will provide the impetus for a greater balance between industry and
agriculture and will ease the economic burden of farm relief from the
rest of the nation, at the same time providing necessary defense mate-
rial for national security.
Of the $1,051,581,989 awarded for new plant construction and
expansion (January 31, 1941) the follovj-ing states were the principal
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reoipients :
*
Indiana $189,763,000
Iowa 122,820,000
Michigan ( nearly) 90 , 000 , 000
Ohio 84,000,000
Virginia 65,000,000
West Virginia 65,000,000
Eight others
less than 5,000,000
Montana & North Dakota No Contracts
Some of the larger plants now under construction are at
the folloiving locations:**
Charlestown, Indiana, about twelve miles from Louisville,
Kentucky, This plant will cover an area of 4,500 acres, manufacture
smokeless powder and be leased and operated by the E« I, DePont,
Nemomo & Company. It is expected that the plant will employ an aver-
age working force of seven to eight thousand men,
Radford
,
Virginia
, about forty-four miles from Roanoke, the
Hercules Powder Company will construct at government expense an addi-
tional smokeless powder plant,
Detro it, Michigan - The Chrysler Corporation has under con-
struction a tank factory which is being located contrary to the defense
rules, as the need for speed is said to prevent the consideration of
other locations. This plant will construct vmr tanks at a fixed price
from government plans and pay |l,00 per year rental for the use of the
plant. Four to five thousand men will be employed at this plant,
Denver
,
Colorado - Small arms plant to be operated by
Editor ial Research Reports
,
Voltime 3, No, 7, February 20, 1941.
**Factory, August 1940.
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Remington Arms Company, of Bridgeport, Connecticut,*
Milan, Tennessee - Ammunition loading plant to be operated
by Proctor & Gsimble Defense Corporation.
Sandusky , Ohio - TNT and DNT plant to be operated by Trojan
Powder Company of Allentpvm, Pennsylvania.
Charlestown , Indiana-- Bag-loading plant to be operated by
the Goodyear Engineering Corporation of Akron, Ohio.
West Henderson
,
Kentucky^ - Amm.onia plant to be operated by
the Solvay Process Company,
Childersburg
,
Alabama - Smokeless powder plant.
Fort Yforth , Texas - Aircraft assembly plant to be operated
by the Consolidated Aircraft Corporation,
Tulsa , Oklahoma - Aircraft assembly plant to be operated by
Douglas Aircraft Corporation.
Kansas City
,
Mjssouri - Arms plant and bomber plant,
Dallas, Texas - Aircraft plant,
Cincinnati, Ohi_o - Aircraft plant.
This impressive list indicates that decentralization is the
modern trend particularly in defense industries, and that the govern-
m.ent policies are generally folloV'red throughout the entire program in
distributing nev; plant construction over a laree inland area. Pre-
caution is the keynote of all construction regarding location and
serves as a practical indicator of what the future may hold for cen-
tralized industry.
The government's policy in plant construction to date has
been to select the plant site according to the rules mentioned

previously or at least as close to the r^iles as practical, estimate
the cost of the plant, and appropriate the funds for its construction.
The firms which will lease the plant supervise its construction and
take care of the necessary details. Upon the completion of the struc-
tures (which requires nine to fourteen months for airplane or motor
plants, eight to eleven months for a machine gun factory, and eight
to twelve months for a powder mill) the manufacturer leases the plant
at one dollar per year and "begins operations according to government
contract but with private management in control.
The need for speed with maximum production makes a great
deal of expansion of existing plants necessary though undesirable.
In the financing of this type of construction, industry is expected
to finance its o-^vn construction, secure loans from private sources,
or to take advantage of Reconstruction Finance Corporation funds. All
costs for plant additions for defense purposes may be amortized for
tax pxArposes over a period of five years, provided construction was
started after June 1940 and that the necessary certificates of neces-
sity have been issued by the Defense Board,
To assist firms in securing funds from private sources,
trial orders and "letters of intention" as well as actual contracts
have been issued or avrarded. This permits the borrowing firms to
finance a majority of the necessary construction with 4^ bank loans
or private investment and at the same time relieves the government
of much detail and expense in negotiating for construction facilities.
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Problexns Aocorupanying Decentralization Plans
As each nevr plant site is chosen and industrial construction
"begins, nevr problems face government and industry in ever-increasing
proportions. Granted that a site meets all the requirem.ents of mili-
tary strategy and that there is an adequate supply of labor, trans-
portation, and raw materials, a majority of these areas do not possess
skilled labor in abundance. In fact, skilled labor is rapidly becom-
ing an acute shortage in many of the congested areas which have normal:^
had a surplus of this vital commodity.
Through the vr.P.A,, N.Y.A.; trade schools and industry, a
labor-training program is intensively under way to meet the new demands
of industry. Apprentices are being trained on the floor of the largest
plants, and the other agencies have gone so far as to place schools on
a tvrenty-four hoxir basis. This program, releases som.e of the skilled
artisans from simple work so that they may devote more time to intri-
cate problem.s or in training younger v/orkers.
In spite of adequate labor reserves for many industries,
bottle-necks in both labor and management are already foreseen. New
plant construction will increase requirem.ents for skilled labor and
management far in excess of the existing supply, Ylhen it is recog-
nized that good tool designers, machinists, and tool makers require
several years of apprenticeship, a shortage in these vital trades
cannot be readily alleviated. The emploj'ment of skilled, semi-skilled,
and unskilled labor is retarded pending the design or manufacture
of tools, dies and jigs, v/hich are necessar7/ for industrial manufacttir-
ing.
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Similarly, a severe shortage in capable executives to
operate new plants is prevalent and many contracts are going to the
larger concerns having capable staffs vrhich can undertake the con-
struction and operation of these nev; defense plants.
The United States Unemployment service canvasses each local
area every thirty days and tries to ascertain the employers' labor
requirements for the next sixty days in an effort to supply the right
type of labor at the right time. The service makes arrangements for
migration into other areas in order that productive capacity and la-
bor may be utilized to the greatest advantage.
A certain am.ount of experienced workers will necessarily
have to be transferred from existing plants to train and supen'-ise
the new labor forces which are assembled to operate these new plants.
It is planned to utilize the services of families of farmers now
working marginal lands, and once the emergency is over it is felt that
their return to the farms will not cause a great economic shock to the
nation as they will have their normal means of subsistence as soon as
they return to their former occupations.
The 300,000 miles of power lines erected by the Rural
Electrification Administration may some day bring about a revival of
the home workshop as decentralization is extended to include every
town or farm.. The day may come when in addition to relieving a great
deal of drudgery, electricity may provide the farmer with a new duty -
namely, that of tending some small machine during the long v/inter
months, as a means of increasing the nation's productive capacity.
In a recent radio address. President Roosevelt predicted
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that many of these 'Var industries " would be converted to peace-
time production. He, therefore, insinuates that he intends to keep
these plants in operation and continue the development of manufactur-
ing in these areas after the emergency is over. This would imply that
a "balance betvreen manufacturing and agriculture is to be maintained in
these areas as a fixed policy.
The major part of the problem of maintaining this balance
seems to be left in the hands of chemists and scientists. It is highly
possible that a nev^ decentralized industrial order is on the threshhold.
HenrjT- Ford has visualized the worker spending several months in the
factory and then enjoying the sunshine and life in the country for a
portion of the year. The cooperation of and the interdependence betvreen
farm and factory would be created by the introduction of surplus agri-
cultural products as raw materials for industry. Although we may re-
gard some of these ideas as approaching too closely to Utopian ideals
for* practical purposes, it will not be surprising to find a new era
evolving through developments in the chemical laboratory.
The proponents of decentralization visualize the day when
agriculture and industry will be combined into harmonious unison, and
a major portion of agricultural surplus will be absorbed for industrial
processes. Even though their visions may be far-fetched, there are
indications that agriculture, in the future, will provide industry
with more rav/ materials.
The introduction of alcohol blends in gasoline and its in-
creased popularity may consume a large part of our grain surplus. De-
velopments in the use of Soya beans as a base for synthetic enamels and
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for the manufacture of plastics are indicators of vrhat may "be expected.
Experiments in synthetic rubber, wool from milk, nylon and other syn-
thetic domestic substitutions for commodities may eventually supplement
our present manufacturing facilities and utilize our decentralized war
factories for the artificial production of imported raw materials.
Our airplane factories are expected to continue the mass pro-
duction principles of manufacturing, after the emergency, to supply
light airplanes for private use. Small planes, though constructed with
inefficient facilities, have already approached the cost of a medium-
price automobile. Improvements in design have brought such craft
beyond the experimental stage, and their common acceptance by the
general public is assured. It is further expected that the thousands
of pilots turned out by the Civil Aeronautics program and the naval and
army forces vrill continue their interest in aviation and create a new
future for aviation similar to the era which introduced the automobile.
The next generation will, it is predicted, "take to the air," and steps
taken by the aviation industry toward mass production, though it may
not fully utilize its entire manufacturing capacity, will result in the
creation of a new phase of the aviation industry which will prevent the
deterioration of the facilities which this emergency forces us to build.
As new communities come into existence and decentralization
becomes a reality, new developments in combination with old policies
will have to be coordinated for the efficient functioning of industry
and government. In the case of railroads, subsidies for lines serving
defense areas may be necessary to maintain transportation service to
factories which do not provide a sxifficient volume of freight and

-77-
government construction and maintenance of certain lines may he neces-
sary,
A unified national power system interconnecting both private
and government lines may be desirable to insure sufficient generating
capacity for "peak" loads or to provide ample power for areas whose
generating facilities are temporarily disabled or destroyed by enemy
activity. An innovation in flexible power generation has been recently
introduced by the General Electric Company, The plan consists of con-
structing a quantity of shallow draft vessels vv-ith complete Diesel
generating plants in their hold. These mobile generating stations
would be towed to strategic positions in lakes, rivers or canals, as
well as along the seacoast, and employed to provide povrer at a loca-
tion where the need is only temporary', and the installation of com-
plete generating facilities vrould be im.practicable, to provide power
for emergency purposes when other means are disrupted, or to supplant
existing facilities where the service is insufficient.
The next few years may witness the construction of steam
generating plants at the coal m.ine and through the systematic inter-
connection of power provide service over larger areas, resulting in
greater possibilities for decentralized industry by the equalization
of peak pov.^er loads on a nation-wide basis,
With the development of nev; industries and the expansion of
old ones to provide an "arsenal for the democracies," adequate housing
for the hordes of workers which are converging in the new, as well as
the old, industrial centers creates additional problems. Entire com-
munities have experienced a relative "boom" as blue prints and defense
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plans have begun to take shape, and as economic lav;-8 operate, more
of the worker's pay check goes into food and lodging as the scarcity
of these essentials becomes more apparent.
In addition to the expenditure of millions of dollars for
plant construction, the government has found it necessary to provide
funds for defense housing. The Lanham Act has provided $150,000,000
for housing of this nature, and construction is underv/ay to alleviate
the shortap;e in dwellings. In centers like Rockdale, Illinois,
Hartford, Connecticut, and Portsmouth, New Hampshire, rents are said
to have reached the point where one half of the worker's earnings are
expended for lodgings, and sleeping in automobiles and garages is said
to be a common occurrence,
V/herever possible, the defense -housing construction is de-
signed to dovetail into the regular housing program. Prefabricated
housing is receiving new consideration particularly where it is felt
that construction is temporary and dismantling and removal of homes
to other locations will be necessary.
As a flirther step in remedying the housing shortage, it was
planned to provide trailers for defense vrorkers, but unless new faci-
lities are built, army orders receiving preference may delay delivery
as mnch. as two years. If trailer com^panies can expand their present
facilities and incorporate the mass production principles of automo-
bile manufacture, a decided increase in the number of units maniifac-
tured can be predicted, A majority of trailer units ordered by the
army are for the purpose of housing temporary workers engaf;ed in army-
post construction work which is relatively of short duration, and as
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training camps are constructed amy requirements virill probably decrease.
The trailer would prove particularly useful for many workers,
for defense industries may not be permanent and housing costs might be
unnecessary expenditures. As to the convenience of movable homes, no
better example can be given that the colonies of trailers which have
been recently sponsored by the Departm.ent of Agricult\we for migrating
workers. We find that these modern caravans, consisting of up to fifty
trailer units, possess adequate living accommodations for entire
families and most of the conveniences which small communities possess,
including a generating plant which supplies electricity for lighting,
cooking, and recreational facilities. To be able to adapt our defense
workers to these livine conditions would be the greatest step in having
a mobile labor supply than has ever been seen. Workers and their
families could move from one area to another v.ath a few hours' travel,
thus placing workers in areas where they are most needed and permit-
ting a safer and more adequate dispersal of one of the most valuable
resources a nation has - its people.
With the announcement of industrial decentralization for
defense, a great deal of alarm, was expressed by the established manu-
facturing areas through their boards of trade. Chambers of Commerce,
and Oongressmen. A superficial exam.ination of the defense program
might lead one to suppose that radical changes were to be expected as
a result of the nevf policies of government, but the opposite conditions
were the primary aims,
A certain amount of decentralization has been possible as a
result of new plant construction in rural inland areas which at present
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is not designed to compete with existing industry but represents addi-
tional manufacturing facilities which are needed because of the presenb
emergency. The av/arding of contracts on a wide geographical area,
though it does not result in actnal decentralization, results in a ten-
dency for plants to establish branch facilities, and it accomplishes
results approximating decentralized conditions by distributing contracts
on the basis of plant location in a region or area.
This policy is also effective in permitting the entire nation
to participate in the prosperity which will accompany the tremendous
expenditures of the next fevr years. It is sound economy and good
politics to distribute the national income over a vride area. The ten-
dency in av/arding contracts has resulted in certain areas experiencing
a greater percentage of work than others, but contracts cannot be
awarded solely on a geographical basis because there are other factors
which must be considered.
The concentrated areas have a greater percentage of population
and skilled labor. They possess the plants and equipment for production
and they are able to exert their share of political pressure to sec\are
what they consider a just proportion of the available contracts.
Undoubtedly, certain areas will retain an aggressive spirit
in order to secure the greatest volume of business, and decentralization
will be fought to the bitter end as soon as it threatens the industrial
supremacy of existing centers. This may be said to be the natural
reaction of those whose investments or interests are jeopardized.
Changing conditions can seriously affect the economic status of the
dominating groups of individuals and bring financial disaster to the
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communities which they represent.
Regardless of any action which organized business can as-
semble to counteract these nev; trends, the influence which can be
exerted will be limited. The cooperative attitude of major industries
and most recent policies of government indicate the importance in v^ar-
fare of decentralization. This military necessity may also be the
means of bringing about a condition which is economically desirable.
The fact that certain sections of the nation may eventually pay a very
high price for changes in industrial location does not trouble the
proponents of decentralization to any great extent, because if the
nation as whole will benefit then the suffering of a smll part of
that nation will be insignificant v:hen it is weighed in relation to
the results which are accomplished.
Probable Future of Established Manufacturing Areas
As a Result of Decentralization
The complete collapse of established industrial areas cannot
be expected to occui; for changing conditions result usually in the
continued employment of a substantial part of the wage earners of a
given area. It is difficult to conceive that any of our industrial
cities will some day have the appearance of the "ghost towns" of the
early V^est, An idea of the probable condition of many centers can
be secured by an inspection of the empty mills of the leading Massa-
.
ohusetts cities. Counteracting factors may prevent Y/holesale decentra-
lization or migration, but if the trend secures sufficient momentum,
startling changes can easily transfdrm possibilities into realities,
and the era of decentralization m.ay easily take its place in the annals
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of history along; with the Industrial Revolution and other important
developments of economic significance.
In the face of comparatively recent developments in trans-
portation, communication and povrer transmission, tof^ether v;ith the
policies of government, military strategy, and the economic desira-
bility of decentralization, it is difficult to see what factors will
intervene to prevent indxistrial relocation. The rapidity with which
it will develop cannot be predicted at this time because it will be
influenced by developments abroad. It can be stated, hovrever, as a
certainty that it will materialize in the near future as a distinct
trend which will be substantially detrimental to the industrial de-
velopment of the Nevr England and Middle Atlantic States unless some
unforeseen development occurs which will check the movements.
Basing our predictions upon existing conditions and the
influences affecting them, we can expect m.ajor and far-reaching
changes in the industrial structure of the United States, A com-
plete substitution of rural areas for urban industries might be
in the far distant future, but domestic and foreign developments
invariably indicate that regardless of the resistance which is placed
atainst industrial migration and decentralization from the established
areas it is bound to occur within the space of relatively few years.
The present generation has already vritnessed the gradual de-
cline of the importance of Nev/' England as a textile, shoe, farm
machinery, or hardware center. It has witnessed the industrial rise
of the South and the Central and Western States, and there are
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indioations that this mif?;ratlon v:ill become more pronounced as the
movement gains momentum.
The New England and Middle Atlantic States have held their
industrial supremacy solely by ingenuity and economic barriers which
prevented westv/ard migration. The decline, in importance of foreign
exports, and the distance which these areas are from rav; materials,
and the geographical center of population, may be listed as the princi-
pal factors contributing to diminishing industrial importance. A
highly skilled labor supply and an invigorating climate vfhich induces
greater expenditure of physical energy have been the dominating forces
which have held industry to these areas for such a long period of time.
Naturally, these attributes can be expected to still be important in
preventing a total migration of industry because certain industries
will still find it profitable to bear the costs of transportation, on
articles which will stand such costs, in order to profit from the
major attractions which the areas offer.
Uniform labor laws and large scale union activity have re-
moved the attraction of many areas as a source of cheap labor, and
with the standardization of competitive factors, location can be ex-
pected to receive more consideration as one of the means of meeting
competition and reducing costs.
The nation's central areas are becoming increasingly at-
tractive as they are in the center of the country and thus are located
in a better position to serve t^-ieir m^arkets. Transportation facili-
ties are less expensive and the proximity of raw materials bring econo-
mies which areas lacking strategic location cannot realize.
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Perhaps as a result of the preceding paragraphs the reader
visualizes a permanent and gloomy depression for the north eastern
part of the country. Although a decline in manufacturing importance is
a certainty, the complete collapse of industry in this area is incon-
ceivable, New industries are continually being created, and the de-
velopments in old manufacturing processes are constantly creating op-
portunities for employment. The north eastern afea possesses shipping
terminals and facilities which enable it to remain as a center of com.-
merce with European and South American markets, and a revival of foreign
trade can result in utilization of efficient labor as an effective com-
petitor for many inland areas and foreign countries in the world markete.
The decline in population which this area will probably experience in
the near future may, in the end, result in greater benefits. If a
greater balance can be secured betvj-een agriculture and industry, and
a portion of the excess or unemployed labor moves westward, conditions
will tend to be more stable in this section, resulting in greater econo-
mic security particularly during periods of business recession. Decen-
tralization does not show favoritism for any class or group, but its
operation tends to equalize population and industry over a voider area
in order that the average income of a greater number of people may be
increased and their economic v/elfare may be improved.
Future Population Trends Result ing From Decentralization
The present government policy of decentralizing defense
industries can be expected to have its affects on the nation's popu-
lation trends. Recent figures issued by the United States Employment
Service show that 900,000 skilled workers and 1,100,000 semi-skilled
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workers are still unemployed at this phase in the development of the
rearmament period. It can be reasonably assumed that a substantial
portion of this labor is a surplus in its present location and it can-
not be absorbed by industry because of a lack of facilities. With the
construction of new plants or the full utilization of facilities in
other areas, these irorkers are being absorbed at the rate of 16,000 per
month in other sections or localities as skilled workers, supeirvisors
or foremen. Assuming that these unemployed workers were not capable
of a satisfactory performance in their capacities, their services can
be utilized to take the places of men who are transferred to these new
plants in supervisory or key positions.
The coastal areas will probably face a decline in population
within the next few years, and these areas with the greatest income and
population will become of secondary importance as the geographical ex-
pansion of the nation materializes. The absence of immigration and
the declining birth rate v.all be positive checks to population in-
creases, while the migration of individuals vrill result in substantial
decreases. The attractiveness of the new industrial centers for the
youth of the older areas is a constant magnet which draws them avfay
from our concentrated industrial districts, A large percentage of
our technical and commercial talent finds in the Central and '.Western
areas greater opportunity for employment and advancement, resulting in
a further decline in the population of the older areas.
In the event of an "Axis" victory in the present war, we may
find that an additional factor may be introduced to further influence
the population trends. With economic isolation for the United States
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and the decline of industrial activity contributing to unemployment,
many of our immigrants who have been able to save a small amount of
capital vrill turn their faces toward other horizons vrhioh hold greater
promise than their adopted land. Technological changes and the stan-
dardization of working conditions make it increasingly difficult for
illiterate or poorly educted people of foreign countries to compete
with the skilled native workers, and the increasing policy of elimina-
ting alien workers from, the payrolls does not benefit their status,
Imm.igrants, as a general rule, have been the greatest contri-
bution to population increases as a result of influx of population and
larger families. Their emigration to nations which may offer them, as
individuals, greater opportunities for survival may cause a greater de-
cline in the population of the nation. This v/ould materially contri-
bute to a greater decline in the population of the north eastern area,
where these people have found it practical to reside. To these indi-
viduals mip:ration is a comjnon occurrence, and regardless of their adap-
tation to the environment of an adopted land, the homeland persists in
attracting them back, particularly when they have accumulated a sm.all
amount of capital.
The increased importance of the Pacific States as manufactur-
ing centers is rapidly increasing to the point v/here, for practical
purposes, they will be self-siifficientj and the high costs of trans-
portation incident to maniifactured merchandise make this development
inevitable. Yfith the loss of manjr of its western markets, the decline
in manufacturing activity of the East will prompt skilled labor to
turn its attention to the new industrial frontiers and thus virtually

the sole remaining asset of the north eastern industrial section, namely,
skilled labor, will tend to be less abundant.
The primary purpose of the inland plants was said to be a re-
habilitation of the low income famgroups. Assuming that these unem-
ployed workers or trainees are not attracted to the new plants in
sufficient quantities to result in a population trend there are other
factors which will be instrinnental in influencing the movement of indi-
viduals. As the operators of marginal farm lands find their family in-
comes increasing there vrill be increased tendencies to spend money for
luxuries and consumer goods. Entrepreneurs who are seeking new oppor-
tunities for capital investment will be attracted to the nevrer areas
and additional employment will be provided by many enterprises which
find the localities fertile ground for expansion.
A new indicator of the increasing mobility of population and
labor is the adoption of the automobile trailer as a housing unit by
defense workers, A recent survey made in Business ?feek (December 7,
1940) shoed that Charlestown, Indiana, had six hundred worker-owned
trailers and that eleven hundred additional units were on order but
undeleivered. The convenience and popularity of this innovation in
housing in one community of the nation serves as a suggestion of what
one could expect if an analysis of all the defense sites were made
throughout the country and if prompt delivery could be secured of the
units which are ordered. Such a highly mobile labor supply could easily
be an economic and social undesirability but it would be instrumental
in stabilizing conditions on a national basis and result in the more
complete utilization of labor particularly in periods of emergency.
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Prohable Economic and^S^^cial Effects of Deoentralization
Unfortunately, a defense "boom" is more or less a temporary
condition which can prnctically reach a standstill overnight. It can
easily happen that once \».'-ar production ceases, the new manufacturing
facilities will not be turned to peace-time production but will be
closed and kept ready for operation or imder partial operation similar
to government arsenals and shipyards. This would result in the dis-
placement of thousands of workers and a drop in the farm incomes of
the rehabilitated areas. The nev^ plants, particularly the powder
factories, do not represent stable industrial development and though
decentralized and a part of the potential manufacturing capacity of
the nation, they are not needed during normal times. This would be de-
centralization solely for defense and would result in displacement of
the farm relief burden by tem.porary emplo^/ment in a defense industry.
The results of decentralization and the economic effects
upon population would be determined by a number of factors. If the
decentralized plants are not operated after the emergency, the in-
creased income and purchasing povrer of the areas in v^hich they are
located v,rould result in a brief period of prosperity for thos areas,
followed by a return to the same standards of living which were pre-
viously maintained. T]^is would perhaps result in a great deal of dis-
content, because having felt the effects of a higher standard of
living, a return to previous conditions is harder even though it is
accompanied by the consoling resumption of farm relief.
If, on the other hand, the plants are leased to industry
for peace-time production, the income of this group will continue.
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other industries will migrate to those areas, and within a relatively
short time population increases, and a measure of economic stability
would result.
The expansion of nevf industrial areas can only result in the
decline of the north eastern areas as manufacturing centers. This loss
may "be partially offset through the development of other sources of
income, resulting in a comparative prosperity. It must be realized
that the "peak" of development is passed and that a decline to the point
which represents normal manufacturing activity can be anticipated.
Military and diplogiatic developments of the next fev;- months
or years may further change the economic status of the people in the
north eastern area. An involvement in vreir can result in the systematic
destruction of important centers of commerce by sea and air attack.
The possibilities of an attempted invasion by land, of this vital area,
are discussed almost daily. If th^se threatened experiences are re-
alized by the people of this section of the nation, a mass migration
into inland areas might prove desirable, and it illogical to think
that such a large nation with an abundance of sparsely occupied ter-
ritory v-rould attempt to rebuild this area to its former condition after
feeling the effects of intensive military destruction.
Decentralization will have important social effects upon the
people of the nation. In new areas the crowded and unsanitary condi-
tions of our tenement districts will he eliminated, as nevr areas will
be located in undeveloped communities and each dwelling unit can be
economically provided v/ith sufficient land for gardening and recreation.
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Construction will be modern, as coTrununities can be planned according
to efficiency or beatity. It can be expected that persons living in
th'^'se new surroundinrs vrill acquire a "rural" character which is sym-
bolized by neighborliness and a pride in their community. Health,
happiness, and a decrease in crime can be visualized as the eventual
results of industrial change, provided the decentralization theory is
strictly adhered to.
All this sends like an economic and social revolution in an
attempt to bring about ideal conditions in a capitalistic country
which has only recently felt the effects of economic readjustment.
The brief period of the past eight years has resulted in our witnessing
startling social and economic changes which have almost been revolu-
tionary in nature. The gradual evolution of decentralized industry,
accompanied by increased tendencies in that direction as a direct resijlt
of the defense program, must not be entirely discounted by the reader.
Each movement which the government has made in the past was made to curb
excessive production and increase the social and economic welfare of
its people. Now we find that the emerpiency creates the complete re-
versal of its policy of production, but it maintains its social gains
and endeavors to dovetail its farm prograjm, power projects, and con-
struction policies into this new defense program which includes de-
centralization as one of its most important phases.
The increased domination of government over industry can be
expected to materialize as a result of the most recent legislative
developments, A mobile labor force or the shifting of labor to areas
in which it is most needed will naturally involve the conscription of
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labor in order to utilize it to the maximum advantage. This will re-
sult in regimentation, for the states cannot accept responsibility for
individual workers whose mi{r,ration may result in crossing the boundaries
of several states vfithin a short period of time. Besides finding him-
self dependent upon a central government for housing, employment, and
relief, the individual will find a greater control exercised upon his
personal life and freedom, A national standardization of education
will have to be inaugurated to allow the children of migrating workers
to continue their education without interruption regardless of the
number of times a family may m.ove.
Regardless of the spontaneous and cooperative attitude of
industry in assisting the nation's defense effort, there is a lack of
reciprocity in the government's attitude. There are th-reats of govern-
ment control and operation of plants, there is a persistent refusal to
change the maximum hours of the Wage and Hour Lav; for the defense in-
dustries, and there are indications that mans.f'em.ent and wealth may
be conscripted even though conditions may not yet justify such a
step. Instead of encouraging a harmonious relation betvsreen management
and labor, it has widened the rift, and compulsory decisions have in-
variably been on the side of labor. This attitude on the part of the
government may easily be a prelude to dictation to industrial manage-
ment, and compulsory decentralization may some day be the fate of
many vital defense industries.
Existing legislation gives the government unprecedented
authority to construct, manufacture, acquire or operate practically
every type of business that it considers necessary, and this broad

and far-reaching; legislation seems to offer unlimited opportunities
to coerce firms into locations v/hich politicians deem advisable.
War hysteria and emere:encies are convenient excuses to make new in-
roads upon liberty and commerce and whether these are made v/ith good
intentions or bad they vn.ll ultimately bring about the desired re-
sults.
The pressure which political subdivisions of the national
government are able to exert in order to protect state rights can be
counted upon to bring about the repeal of any legislation v^hich tends
to remove the right of free enterprise, and it can be expected that
any lavxs vrhich tend to be unconstitutional will be rapidly repealed.
The importance of a strong central government in times of emergency
is unquestioned by the majority, and its action, even though it is
designed to achieve greater efficiency, safety, or welfare, can easily
have secondary or subsidiary effects vfhich vrill remain after the emer-
gency has passed and laws are repealed.
For example, if the government should force a defense industry
to move its plant to a neiv area, it is doubtful that the plant would
return to its old location if the new location were equal or superior
to the old one, Sim.ilarly, if a group of skilled laborers is trans-
ferred to some v/^estern center by government decree to alleviate a
shortage, if there is a reasonable amount of employment they will have
no occasion to return to their former surroundings which may have little
or no employment to offer.
This suggests that regardless of any temporary rules that
may be forced upon labor or industry to cope with the defense emergency.
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many vrill tend to be lasting chanpes if the economic situation of the
country is favorable for them to assume a permanent character.
This brief digression into the probable results of industri-
al relocation shows the possibilities vrhioh may occur as a result of
decentralization and the means v;hich can be employed to force it ac-
cording to governmental desires. It cannot be denied that compulsory
decentralization would be desirable in defense industries and that
management wisely refrains from resisting change when it knows that
regardless of its desires or attitudes it could be forced to do v^hat
those in charge desire. The establishment of new defense industries
in decentralized areas is to be commended from the vieii\rpoint of
national safety, but in the case of all other industries it can be
predicted that regardless of motional or political influences it can
be expected that economics will be the determining factor in industrial
decentralization in a majority of cases.
The era of big business plants seems to have passed its
climax. Technological changes in industry and mechanization in agri-
culture have been contributing f'actors to surplus production and uji-
emplojnnent. V/orking hours have been reduced, the production of crops
has been curtailed, but there is no relief for the present overburdened
economic structure. ''!e find that relief seems to have become a part
of our economic life and obviously it cannot be regarded as sound
economy to have a part of the population working and supporting the
unem.ployed portion.
The constant reduction of available foreign markets and un-
favorable trade balances further limit the possibilities of increased
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exports. The industrialization of foreign nations limits our ability
to compete for foreign markets, and if our standard of living is to
be retained, we must find the solution of fann surplus and unemploy-
ment within the nation.
The local prosperity which is produced in areas where de-
fense industries are now being located can produce sufficient impetus
for private industry to locate in similar areas to meet expanding
domestic markets. Due to the fact that the defense program can be
utilized by private industry to recapture the costs of building con-
struction within a relatively brief period, it can he readily seen
that progressive business can be expected to take advantage of this
movement to provide itself with ne^v plants in strategic locations at
comparatively small expense. After the plant is converted into peace-
time production, the manufacturer who -ms in a position to visualize
future conditions finds himself better ahle to meet competition, be-
cause of economic location, and centralized industrj"" would lose in
the competitive struggle.
The worker who locates in these new areas can easily find
himself with a double security against economic conditions. The
practicability of part-time farming, ' encouraged by short working
hours, will enable him to raise a large part of his food supply, and
he is better able to withstand the effects of business depression or
seasons of industrial inactivity. The added income v/hich industry
brings to his home and community increases the living standards of
the rural areas, and a more abundant life with a minimum of hardship
and suffering results, (This presupposes that the defense program
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will be the starting point for extensive decentralization to rural
areas of industries which will provide permanent and stable income.)
The social gains which can be made as a result of decentra-
lization have unlimited possibilities. Higher incomes, lower costs
of commodities, and a resulting increased standard of living for more
people can be the outstanding accomplishments. In addition to this,
the redistribution of population will r-^^sult in better living condi-
tions, higher standards of health, and an optimistic outlook on life
in place of the dejected and beaten atmosphere of many of our urban
districts.
Decentralization can be expected to have affects upon the
nation, industry, and agriculture. The eqiialization of income over a
greater proportion of the country and people xTOuld be desirable from
the economic standpoint, and the decline of excessive relief costs
in both our farm and industrial areas would result in social benefits
as well. The costs of crime, insanity and disease attributable to
urban locations, though incalculable, must be trem.endous.
The rising costs of government, the national debt, and taxes
sometimes cause one to wonder where all this will lead. The termina-
tion of the defense program, may bring additional appropriations for
public works and farm relief. Unless constructive steps can be taken
to reduce the severity and avoid a repetion of conditions prevalent
during past depressions, the economic security of the nation can easily
become endangered. There are no indications that our national debt
will be reduced or that our national income will be permanently in-
creased to permit the continuation of the unlimited borrowing which

has "been practiced within the last fev; years. Population trends al-
ready indicate that a stability in population can he expected tovmrd
the end of the next decade, and as opportunities for foreign trade
become less each year, it is obvious that an internal solution of in-
dustrial and economic problems is the only effective alternative to
be found.
With the changes Vv-hich this nevr era in industry and agri-
culture can be expected to bring, there are both shor"b-and long-range
effects v,rhich can be expected to become more evident as time moves on.
With the reduction in local government revenues in those cities most
affected by recent industrial migration and the rise of a degree of
prosperity for communities in new areas, our investigation cannot be
complete without attempting to forecast the effects which this busi-
ness transition may have,
Yfithin the next few years, the entire nation will experience
prosperity, A rise of farm and industrial income will accom.pany in-
dustrial expansion. There y/ill be a substantial decrease in unem-
plo^TTient and a revival of the building industry which had suffered
from, little activity since the nation ^owed signs of having reached
its maximum point of expansion. Employment and higher wages have in-
duced labor migration to both old and nev^ areas, and a general rise in
prices is having its affect on many commodities. This condition is
gradually being felt throughout defense and non-defense industries,
as the increased income gives more people a greater purchasing power.
Industry seems to have started where it left off at the time
of cessation of business activity in 1929, and a repetition of that
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same condition could easily be in store for the entire nation if de-
centralization does not absorb the shock of readjustment at the ter-
mination of the armament period.
For the workers in rural areas who have some income from
manufacturing or those who are able to secure urban employment, the
defense program can result in benefits if they are vrise and plan for
the future,
A large majority of the rural por^ulation ovm their homes,
and many urbanites who had a sm.all amount of capital have moved to
the rural areas during the depression years and have escaped much of
the severity of the depression by living on a smaller income than
urban conditions would have permitted, A revival in business activity
at this time permits many to pay off mortgages, secure additional land,
ptirchase equipment, or set aside funds which will increase their
security in periods of business recession,
A majority of those benefiting from increased income can be
expected to go into nevr debts for luxuries and consumer goods.
Defense industries are absorbing increasing proportions of
the materials which go into the production of consumer goods and a
probable curtailment in production will leave the demand far in excess
of the supply. This scarcity and the constantly increasing purchasing
povrer of consumers can start a price rise vfhich unless checked could
easily result in economic disaster.
The armament program, though it increases national income,
does not increase the national wealth, and certain necessary steps
will have to be taken to prevent the increased purchasing povrer from
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being diverted into an excessive purchase of oonsiOTier goods. Among
the steps which the government can take to control this dangerous
trend may be listed as the introduction of higher taxes, price-fixing,
and the deflection of excess funds which might go into consumer goods
to savings.
Regardless of which of these methods is used, the diversion
of excess earnings into savings would be the most ideal means of con-
serving purchasing power over the armament program for use when the
period cf economic readjustment sets in. If consumer pxirchases can be
postponed to that period, the shock of readjustment will be less severe
as the purchases of consumer goods can be expected to keep employment
from falling excessively. During this same period industrial activity
will be permitted to resume its normal course without the severe re-
cession which would occur if economic forces were allowed to operate
without control.
The city dv/eller generally does not own his home and will pay
out a larger amount of his income for rent, food, luxuries, and recrea-
tion which the rural dweller usually avoids. In the rural sections,
we find an opportunity to provide security for economic repercussions,
while the metropolitan areas offer opportunities for increased spending
and a lack of provision for the future.
Industry during this period will indulge in expansion to meet
both government demands for defense goods and the increased demands
by consumers for articles which a greater purchasing povrer permits.
Many industries in their expansion make their investment in a nevr area
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because they do not desire to place their entire facilities in one
location in the face of changing trends and conditions,
V/hile the increased businef^s activity vdll hide the ap-
parent effects which decentralization vrill be certain to produce, the
movement can be expected to produce its greatest changes with the de-
cline of business activity in the closing phases of the defense pro-
gram. As production tapers off and vrorkers are released, it vfill be
necessary for business to return to normal operations. The factor of
location will be more pronounced because a surplus of skilled labor,
modern tools, equipment, and modern buildings will exist throughout
the entire nation. With the continued operation of labor lavfs and
union activity, modern facilities and strategic location will be the
dominant factors in the economic struggle for survival. Manufacturers
possessing more than one plant can be expected to close those plants
which have no economic advantage over competing locations. The ex-
pense of such decentralization will be practically negligible because
the cost of the new plants has been borne by the defense program*
s
plant-amortization provisions.
The construction of new plants is almost entirely absorbed
by the defense program over a five-year period, and indirectly consists
of subsidizing the relocation cf industry. In speaking with small
manufacturers, one gains the im.pression that though government con-
tracts are desirable, they are figured so closely that the rate of
profit is very small, and even if it v-ere exhorbitant, the excess
profits taxes can be comted upon to control the profit which may be
acquired through this type of work. This vrould suggest that any firm
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participatine; in defense contracts cannot create reserve funds to per-
mit it to carry over the recession which is expected to follov^. Manu-
facturers then, if they make plans for the future, realize that to
reap the full benefits of the program they can construct nevr facili-
ties to duplicate their present plants and thus continue to serve the
demands of private consijmers.
Upon the t'^rmination of defense work the old plant should
have produced a higher rate of profit than defense v/ork, thus provid-
ing reserve funds for the lean years to follovr. New plants, although
they have produced little profit, will have been financed alm.ost
entirely by the defense program.. As they will usually be in a better
location to serve their markets and operate more efficiently, they can
supplement or replace old plants in other areas and vre will then find
that the fvll effects of recent decentralization can be felt.
Certain industries cannot operate efficiently as decentra-
lized units, and a certain amount of centralization vrill remain in
modern industry regardless of v;-hether this centralization incorporates
some of the decentralization theories or not. Furthermore, many in-
dustries will not be able to take advantage of the liberal terms of
the amortization feat\ires because their contribution to national de-
fense is negligible. These factors will consist of stabilizing in-
fluences which will permit existing areas to retain a large part of
their industrial life. It can be expected that many of our large
cities will continue as urban centers, but they .will exist in a more
modified form. Changes will tend to be more or less gradual, and as
industries leave the area a part of the population can be expected to
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follow them.
It can he expected that excessive population and industrial
declines in certain areas will have a severe affect on property values
and the costs of government. The increased mip^ration of industry and
population to nevr areas can easily result in hundrP!ds of empty living
accommodations and industrial sites. The decline in property values
v:ill result in severe effects upon investors and municipal governments.
The lar2;er cities may find it necessarv to curtail some of
their services as decreasing property values and income reduce the
available taxes -".vhich can be collected. The existing taxes will have
to be borne by a smaller number of people and tax rates will rise to
a point vrhere a curtailment of municipal services will be necessary
as the taxpayer's ability to pay decreases. Certain municipal ser-
vices, such as education and medical expenses, decrease with popula-
tion decreases, but other sei^ices remain constant. Financial troubles
can be expected to prevail in many urban centers unless a nev: financial
system can be devised which will either reduce the costs of city govern-
ment or increase its income without excessively increasing the taxpay-
er's costs,
Iklany established industries are already making plans to ab-
sorb the shock of readjustment and their diversified experience in
manufacturing defense articles can be advantageously employed to meet
civilian peace-time needs. The Government can be expected to play its
part in cushioning the changes in industry and employment by using
controlling influences on the financial structure of the nation, at
the same time providing for a gradual demobilization of both industry
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and the military forces.
The average size of the new rural communities is difficult
to predict because many factors may be involved in the detennination
of the most appropriate population. Previous figures quoted shovr
that the toivns of 10,000 or less population seemed to have less
fluctuation during business depressions, and it might be regarded as
the maximum amount of population desired in the community. In
Kingsport, Tennessee, a rural and industrial community, the maximum
population desired, according to the terra's civic leaders, is placed
at 30,000* inhabitants.
If excessive population and industrial location is permitted
in these smaller communities, they can very easily approach the point
where they become urban and the advantages of decentralization begin
to disappear. After a certain size the law of diminishing returns
becomes applicable to cities as well as to business or agriculture, and
the costs of government increase in greater proportion to the number
of inhabitants and the services rendered. Thus, the ultima.te size
must be controlled. To allovf the expansion of to^7ns beyond the point
of economic desirability would minimize the benefits which can be se-
cured, and we would return to the point where we started.
As rural areas become more important as industrial centers,
their economic stability will make them more desirable than urban
locations, A greater number of people will be attracted to them.
This may cause serious declines in investments and real estate in many
Ame'rioa" iReborn , Ralph M, Woods, p, 293, Longmans Green & Co,, 1930
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urban localities, but they vfill be offset by gains in other directions.
It can be expected that a relative decline in the importance of the in-
dustrial north east area and the transfer of many industries from urban
to rural communities will be expensive for someone, but if the national
economy and welfare is improved and gains are made in other sections,
there will be a balance of losses and gains in the nation as a whole.
The urban areas are constantly facing losses as values de-
cline in certain communities and investments make gains in other
areas. Decentralization would cause the same effects on a wider
basis but once the change has been made, its values would remain
fairly constant, and the resulting stability of conditions would be
much more desirable for the community and the investor. The greatest
losses would fall on those who try to resist the change and who are not
far-sighted enough to visualize changing trends and conditions, A
small immediate loss is sometimes preferable to a later total loss,
but many people are optimistic and, as a result, their losses are
greater than one who has the opposite point of vievr and anticipates
the worst.
All this forecasts a chanrce in life and custom.s for a nation
which has always prided itself in enormous ventures whether they were
translated in tei-ms of money, buildings, cities or charity. Big busi-
ness and mass production seemed to be the solution of economic prob-
lems and the ways to a better life. Regardless of any shortcomings
of our ideas in that direction they have been a contribution to our
way of life and national existence. The financial crash of 1929
demonstrated that size was not the only universal element to be
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considered in the industrial system. Over-expansion and dimini-
shing returns brought industry to its senses by their severe ef-
fects in the years that followed, and though size was recognized as
a determining factor in operating efficiency for many industries, it
was no longer regarded as the ultimate goal for every firm.
Present indications are that America is eventually destined
to become a nation of small communities instead of a vast area domin-
ated by large cities and industrial concentration. Large business
will have its importance in the nevr order, but branch plants and
small business can be expected to flourish in rural areas, Nevr
developments in science and chemistry can he expected to blend both
agriculture and industry, and the internal development of the country
will bring about a stabilized condition which is only slightly dis-
trubed by economic changes. The diversification of rural industries
vrill be a contributing factor to a nominal prosperity, and savings
through the full utilization of by-products, elimination of unneces-
sary transportation, and the economies to be derived from a rural
location can easily be the n^.eans of providing m.ore people vfith the
necessities and luxuries of life at a lower cost. There will be a
standardization of opportunities and culture as urban and rural
populations intermingle, and the happiness and well-being of the
majority will supplant the si;periority and well-being of the few.
The natviral operation of decentralization does not envisage
socialism or communism, and it will not encourage these tendencies
unless the government assures greater dictatorial povrers and forces
change in a more direct manner. The small community, once it attains
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the desired decree of 'balance between industry and ap;rioulture, would
permit a much more complete operation of the democratic principles of
government. It vrould encourage the restoration of individualism and
result in the release from economic slavery of thousands of indivi-
duals who have become subject to both industry and government to a
startling degree. Communism, socialism, and fascism could never com-
pete with democracy in a nation rich in economic resources and where
greater opportunities would exist for each man who could believe those
sacred v;ords that "all men are created equal,"
In the presentation of this data on decentralization, we
have tried to show the pr'^sent status of industrial location and the
influences and factors which had a bearing upon the centralization of
industry. The difficulties which a lack of decentralization brings
in regard to defense ha^^e been enumerated, and the common methods
which can be employed to defend our population and productive facili-
ties have been demonstrated. As a r3sult of these important revela-
tions, it can be concluded that decentralization is desirable, and
an attempt has been made to shovi that the importance of economic bar-
riers as deterring factors to decentralized industry, particularly
in the light of recent developments, have decreased.
Decentralization was placed into two major classifications,
and the extent of natural industrial decentralization and the artifi-
cial inducem.ents which are in operation to produce relocation for
national security have been shown. The recent developments which
vnll increase industrial chan?!;es and the possible affects which these
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changes may have on the people and nation as a whole have been the
final steps in the consideration of the subject which has become of
paramount importance, particularly in our o;^! g;eographioal area, which
seems destined to feel its adverse affects the most.
Economic functions may be said to operate in cycles, and re-
gardless of any artificial forces which are used to control or in-
fluence their operation, they invariably make their operation felt..
In addition to thf^se reactions, it must be recognized that change is
a constant and dynamic force which is constantly operating to prevent
the stagnation and degeneration of society. Decentralization has
achieved greater interest and prominence in the past decade and it
may easily be another phase in the economic development of the nation
which can prove beneficial in many respects as time goes on.
M&ny foresee the end of democracy and the stabilization of
the nation on its present basis. They are resigned to the fact that
the machine has released men from industry and agriculture and that
unemployment and poverty are permanent additions to our economic system.
The feeling is prevalent that the age of opportunity h?.s passed and
men must resign themselves to be either slaves or paupers of society
and helpless pawns in a v/ar-mad world which cl^ors for more machines
for construction and still more for destruction. It seems that life
is destined to be a struggle betv/een men, communities, and nations
with poverty for the masses and vrealth for only a few.
The increasing span of life and industry *s reluctance to
hire older men is an additional reason for men's dejected outlook on
life. If decentralized industry can influence workers to purchase

-107-
small farms during their period of maximijm earnings, they will have
a greater degree of security in their old age as they vrill have a
means of su>^sistence if employers refuse to avail themselves of their
services. In combination with social security payments, workers too
old to engage in active vmrk vrould be in a ^etter position to enjoy
their old age when they are established in their own home and in a
small community possessing a friendly spirit.
Only an important economic change in the structure of the
nation as accomplished through industrial relocation can dismiss the
attitude that "the world owes us a living" from the minds of the
coming generations. Conditions are favorable, a change is necessary
for both national and economic security, the defense program provides
the means, and whether it is wanted or not, more extensive decentra-
lization is on the way,
America can 16ok fon^rd with a new hope in relocation as
a means of strengthening the nation against military conquest, in-
creasing the opportunities for a more abundant life for the majority
of the people, and promoting health and happiness through neutrali-
zing and eliminating a majority of the undesirable economic and social
forces which exist in many of our urban centers.

APPENDIX A
Type of Materials Required
By Each Purchasing Branch of United States Army
1. Quartermaster Corps . Office supplies, solid fuels, lubri-
cants, liquid fuels, paints, cotton, cotton goods, silk, silk goods,
wool, woolen goods, leather, leather goods, machinery, hand tools, ve-
hicles, asbestos, electrical apparatus, hemp and hemp goods, jute and
jute goods, linen and linen goods, paper and paper articles, rubber and
rubber goods, skins and products manufactured from skins, wood and wooden
products, forage and straw, livestock, dyestuffs, camp and mess equip-
ment, hardware, brushes and brooms, musical instruments, furniture, fur
and fur goods, printing equipment and supplies and accessories peculiar
thereto, shipping equipment and materials peculiar to the construction
and repair of shipping equipment, docking, loading and ;anloading equip-
ment, laundry plants, salvage plants, buildings, builders' equipment and
supplies, limber, plumbing equipment and supplies, pov/er, lighting and
heating plants, fire preventing and fire fighting equipment, refrigera-
ting plants, water supply plants, internal combustion m.otors, vehicles
and motors and motor-drawn chassis and bodies, parts and accessories,
harnesses
•
2. Medical Department , General chemicals, medical, surgical,
hospital supplies, etc.
3. Ordnance Department. Parts, materials and accessories for
ammunition and explosives, parts and accessorites for artillery, auto-
matic arms, equipment and supplies peculiar to forge shops, equipment
and supplies peculiar to foundries, m.easurir^ instruments, equipment
and supplies peculiar to machine shops, ferrous and non-ferrous metals,
optical instruments, pyrotechnics, tractors, tanks, motor-driven combat
vehicles, etc.

4, Corps of Engineers
.
Drafting equipment, equipment and
supplies peculiar to the construction of fortifications, equipment and
supplies peculiar to lumbering, equipment and supplies peculiar to maps,
equipment and supplies peculiar to the construction of railroads, equip-
ment and supplies peculiar to the construction of roads, searchlights,
equipment and supplies peculiar to field "bridges, cable and wire, demo-
lition and miscellaneous equipment, etc«
5, Signal Corps , Equipment and supplies peculiar to sound
ranging, central office arid outside plant equipment, installation of
telephone systems, radio station equipment and installation, batteries,
parts and accessories including charging sets, electrical communication
equipment, non-electrical communication equipment, electrical instruments,
meteorological instruments, photographic instruments, cinematographic
equipment
•
6, Chemical Warfare * Service equipment and supplies peculiar
to defensive and offensive gas warfare, etc.
Air Corps. Aircraft and accessories.
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APPEITDIX B
CLASSIFICATION OF ESSENTIAL DEFETJSE INDUSTRIES
(Derived from priority circulars used during the first World War)
Ratings Defined in First World War - Priority Commodities Board
Class AA included only emergency war -work of an exceptional and urgent
nature.
Class A included all other war work, such as the manufacture of arms,
ammunition, destroyers, submarines, battleships, transports,
merchant ships, airplanes, locomotives, military trucks, and
the like.
Class B included all orders and work which, while not primarily designed
to help the prosecution of the war, were essential to national
welfare, minimum civilian needs, or possessed exceptional im-
portance for some other reason.
Class C included activity which, while not itself covered by the
priority certificates issued in the first three groups, was
to be utilized to assist or further any one of the activities
or functions requiring preferential treatment.
Class D included all other orders and work.
From: M Day
,
By Leo M, Cheme
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M^PENDIX C
LIST OF ESSENTIAL WAR INDUSTRIES
Aircraft - Plants engaged principally* in manufacturing aircraft, air-
supplies and equipment - I**
Ammimition - Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same for the
United States Government and the Allies - I
Army and Navy - Arsenals and navy yards - I
Army and Navy - Cantonments and camps - I
Arms ( sma11) - Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same for the
United States Government and the Allies - I
Bags - Hemp, Jute and Cotton Plants engaged in manufacturing same - IV
Blast Furnaces - Producing Pig Iron - I
Boots and Shoes - Plants engaged exclusively in manufacturing same - IV
Brass and Copper Plants engaged principally in rolling and drawing
copper, brass, and other copper alloys in the form of sheets,
rods, wire and tubes - II
Chain - Plants engaged principally in maniifacturing iron and steel chain
-
III
Chemicals - Plants engaged principally in mantifacturing chemicals for
the production of military and naval explosives, ammunition
and aircraft, and use in chemical warfare - I
Chemicals - Plants, not otherwise classified and listed, engaged prin-
cipally in maniifacturing chemicals - IV
Coke - Plants engaged principally in producing metallurgical coke and
by-products including toluol - I
The word "principally" means 75% of the total plant production,
Class I industries are those of exceptional importance in connection
with the prosecution of \mr.

Cotton - Plants engaged in the compression of cotton - IV
Cranes - Plants engaged principally in manufacturing locomotive
cranes - II
Cranes - Plants engaged principally in manufacturing travelling
cranes - III
Domestic Consumers - Fuel and electric energy for residential consvtmp-
tion, including homes, apartment houses, residential flats,
restaurants, hotels - I
Domestic Consumers - Fuel and electric energy not otherwise specifi-
cally listed - III
Drugs - Medicines and medical and surgical supplies - Plants engaged
principally in manufactwing same - IV
Electrical Equipnent - Plants engaged principally in manufacturing
same - III
Explosives - Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same for
military and naval pijrposes for the United States Govern-
ment and the Allies - I
Explosives - Plants, plants not othervsrise classified or listed, en-
gaged principally in manufacturing same and not otherwise
listed - III
Farm Implements - Plants engaged principally in manufacturing agri-
cultural and farm-operating equipment - TV
Feed - Plants engaged principally in preparing or manufacturing feed
for livestock and poultry - I
Ferro Alloys - Plants engae;ed principally in producing ferrochrome,
ferro manganese, ferromolyhdenum, ferrosilicon, ferro-
tungsten, ferrouranium, ferrovanadium, ferrozeconium - II

Fertilizers - Plants engaged principally in producing same - TV
Fire Brick - Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same - IV
Foods - Plants engaged principally in producing, milling, refining,
preserving, refrigerating, wholesaling or storing food
for human consumption, embraced with the following des-
cription: All cereals and cereal products, meats inclu-
ding poultry, fish, vegetables, fruit, sugar, syrups,
glucose, butter, eggs, cheese, milk and cream, lards,
lard compounds, oleomargarine and other substitutes for
butter or lard, vegetable oils, beans, salt, coffee, baking
powder, soda and yeast, ammonia for refrigeration - I
Foods - Plants engaged principally in producing, milling, preparing
refining, preserving, refrigerating, or storing food for
human consumption not otherwise specifically listed (ex-
cepting herefrom plants producing confectionery, soft drinks
and chewing gum) - III
Food Containers - Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same - IV
Foundries (iron) - Plants engaged principally in the manufacture of
gray iron and malleable iron castings - IV
Guns (large) - Plants engaged principally in maniifacturing same for the
United States Government and the Allies - I
Ice - Plants engaged in principally manufacturing same - III
Insecticides and Fungicides - Plants principally engaged in manufactur-
ing same - TV
Laundrie s - IV
Machine Tools - Plants engaged principally in manufacturing seune - II
Mines - Coal - I

Mines - Producing metals and ferro alloy minerals - II
Mines - Plants engaged principally in manufacturing mining tools and
equipment - III
Nevrspapers and Periodicals - Plants engaged principally in printing
newspapers or periodicals which are entered at the post-
office as 2nd-class mail matter - IV
Oil and Gas - Plants engaged principally in producing oil or natural
gas for fuel or for mechanical purposes, including refining
or manufacturing oil for fuel or for mechanical purposes - I
Oil and Gas - Pipe lines and pimping stations engaged in transporting
oil or natural gas - I
Oil and G_as_- Plants engaged principally in manufacturing equipment
or supplies for producing oil or natural gas, or for refin-
ing or manufacturing oil for fuel or mechanical purposes - III
Public Institutions and Buildings (maintenance and operation of) used
as hotels or sanitariums - I
Public Institutions and Buildings (maintenance and operation of) other
than hospitals and sanitariums - III
Public Ut ilities - Gas plants producing tuluol - I
Public Util itie s - Street railways, electric lighting and power companies,
gas plants not otherwise classified, telephone and telegraph
companies, water supply companies, and like general utili-
ties - II
Public Utilit ies - Plants engaged principally in manufacturing equipment
for railways or other public utilities - II
Pulp and Paper - Plants exclusively used in manvuPacturing same - IV
Railways - Operated by U.S. Railroad Administration - I

Railways - Not operated "by U.S. Railroad Administration (excluding
those operated as plant facilities - II
Ships - (maintenance and operation of) - excluding pleasure craft not
common carriers - I
Ships - Plants engaged principally in "building ships, excluding (a)
pleasure craft not common carriers, (b) ships not built for
the U, S. government or the Allies or under license from
U. S. Shipping Board - I
Soap - Plants engaged principally in mantifacturing same - IV
Steelmaking Furnace s - Plants eng;aged solely in maniifacturing ingots
and steel castings by the open-hearth, Bessemer, crucible,
or electric-furnace process, including blooming mills, bul-
let mills, and slabbing mills for same - I
Steel-Plate Mills - I
Steel-Rail Mills - Rolling rails 50 or more pounds per yard - I
Steel - All plants operating steel-rolling and drawing mills exclusive
of those taking higher classification - III
Tanners - Plants engaged principally in tanning leather - IV
Tanning - Plants engaged principally in manufacturing tanning extracts -
TV
Teyfailes - Plants engaged principally in manufacturing cotton textiles,
including spinning, ineaving, and finishing - IV
Text ile s - Plants engaged principally in mantifacturing woolen textiles,
including spinners, top makers, and weavers - TV
Textiles - Plants engaged principally in manufacturing cotton or v/oolen-
knit goods - IV
Textiles - Plants engaged principally in manufacturing textile machinery
TV

Tin Plates - Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same - III
Tobacco — Only for preserving, drying, curing, packing, and storing
same not for manufacturing and marketing - IV
Tools - Plants engaged principally in manufacturing small or hand tools
for working wood or metal - III
Twine (binder) and Rope - Plants engaged principally in manufacturing
same - IV
War and Nary Departments - Construction work conducted by either the
War Department or the Navy Department of the United States
in embarkation ports, harbors, fortified places, flood-
protection operations, docks, channels, inland waterways,
and in the maintenance and repair of same - II
Wire and Rope and Rope Wire - Plants engaged principally in manufac-
turing same - II
From* M Dajr, by Leo M, Cherne, Part II M-Day and the Businessman
,
pages 66, 67, 68, 69; Simon T. Schuster, New York 1940.

APPENDIX ©
GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISIONS
Used by the U, S, Bureau of the Census for Statistical Purposes
EAST OF THE MISSISSIPPI WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI
New England
Maine
New Hampshire
Vermont
Middle Atlantic
New Jersey-
New York
Pennsylvania
East North Central
Ohio
Indiana
Illinois
Michigan
Y/isconsin
So\jth Atlantic
Delaware
Maryland
District of Colmbia
Georgia
Virginia
T/est Virginia
North Carolina
South Carolina
Florida
East South Central
Kentucky
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Connecticut
West North Central
Minnesota
Iowa
Missouri
North Dakota
South Dakota
Nebraska
Kansas
West South Central
Louisiana
Oklahoma
Texas
Mountain
Montana
Idaho
Wyoming
Colorado
New Mexico
Arizona
Utah
Nevada
Pacific
Washington
Oregon
California

APPENDIX E
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF 'MAGE JOBS
IN SPECIFIED ITOUSTRIES - 1929
(figures are percentages of U.S. total for each industrial group)
Geographical Divisions
Industry
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Electrical machinery,
apparat\3S & supplies
Motor Vehicles, bodies
and parts
Clothing, all branches
Furniture, all kinds
Printing & Publishing
Knit Goods
Chemicals, including
rayon and allied
products, and com-
pressed and liquefied
gases
Petrolevmi Refining
Lijmber & Timber
Canning and Preserving
Bread & Bakery Products
Engines & Tvtrbines
Meat Packing
Cigars & Cigarettes
Leather
Woolens & ''.".'orsteds
Iron & Steel Yforks
Hardware
Silk & Rayon llfg.
Boots & Shoes
Cotton Goods
Glass
14.2 40.6 39.6 3.0
1.5 13.0 75.6 3.4
5.6 54.6 17.8 5.7
6.3 20.7 42.8 4.0
8.6 30.2 29.4 9.6
7.1 48.2 13.5 1.5
5.0 41.2 16.7 1.4
1.6 22.6 14.7 4.6
2.2 1.5 7.8 2.2
1.9 16.4 20.0 5.3
8.3 32.3 24.7 10.0
3.1 17.6 66.2 8.1
2.7 12.5 37.2 31.4
2.9 41.4 14.2 1.2
23.1 36.8 22.7 1.0
67.3 22.1 3.8 0.5
1.1 43.5 40.2 1.6
36.6 17.9 41,5 1.9
19.8 71.5 2.4 ...
38.9 23.7 19.5 12.9
29,9 44.3 0.7 0.1
0.7 38.3 33.1 2.7
0.4 0.5 0.1 0.1 1 A1.4
1.3 1.9 1.1 0.2 2.0
8.0 2.3 2 .1 0.3 3.5
14.3 3.6 2.1 0.2 6.0
6.8 3.0 4.1 1.9 6.4
17.2 10.6 0.4 0.2 1.3
23.0 9.3 0.8 0.3 2.4
2.6 0.7 40.0 3.0 10.1
19.9 17.1 19.1 3.2 19,4
12.0 2.3 2.6 3.1 36.4
6.9 2.9 5.1 1.9 7.8
0.1 » •
.
0.1 ... 4.8
3.4 1.5 4.5 2.1 4.7
33.1 4,0 1.7 0.2 1.3
13.5 1,8 ... • • • 1.1
3.3 1.6 0.1 0.1 1.2
6.7 3.8 0.1 1.0 1.9
0.2 0.9 0.1 . . • 0,9
5.6 0.6 ... ... 0.1
2.3 2.2 0.1 ... 0.4
53.9 9.1 1.7 ... 0.3
19.0 0.6 3.3 . . • • 2.3
America Reborn, Ralph L. Woods; Longmans, Green & Co., p, 347
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